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Introduction
There has been a steadily increasing academic interest in the effects of discretionary
fiscal policy on key macroeconomic variables such as output, employment and house-
hold demand over the last decade.
The formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is one, but not the only
reason for this development. Naturally, the establishment of the EMU has raised a
number of topics related to fiscal policy and the effectiveness of fiscal instruments
in an institutional framework in which one common central bank is facing several
sovereign fiscal authorities.
The European Central Bank (ECB) decides on monetary policy on a supranational
level, targeting an average of the inflation rates of the member countries. Thus, the
ECB is obviously ill-equipped to respond to asymmetric inflation rate developments
or structural differences among the member countries which imply differences in the
propagation of common shocks as well as shocks to individual member countries.
The EMU features neither a common fiscal authority with the ability to enact fiscal
law on its own nor a substantial union-budget.
It is well-known that the intertemporal budget constraint of the government requires
that either monetary policy or the fiscal authorities have to sufficiently respond to
the stock of public liabilities to guarantee the uniqueness and existence of equlibria,
or in other words, to prevent Ponzi games.
According to Leeper (1991) this type of policy authority is characterized as being
passive while the remaining declared as being active and free to pursue policy objec-
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tives beyond the stabilization of the public debt stock. Awareness of this constraint
has led to the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which aims to
limit the member country’s annual new indebtedness and restrict the accumulated
stock of government debt.
This institutional framework recognizes that in order to allow the ECB to fulfill its
objective in terms of stabilizing the union-wide inflation rate, national fiscal author-
ities have to remain passive in the sense of Leeper (1991).
In any case, fiscal policy is the only flexible tool at the disposal of a member coun-
try’s government to conduct short run stabilization policies on a national level.
The extent to which asymmetric shocks pose a problem for the currency union in
the heart of Europe continues to remain a major concern of policymakers. These
concerns are fueled by the conception that flexible exchange rates and national mon-
etary policy serve as important instruments to stabilize national economies in the
face of domestic shocks. Furthermore, flexible exchange rates are expected to shield
off a country against spillovers and external effects that are originating from shocks
elsewhere in the world economy.
Precisely such concerns, i.e. the costs of joining a currency union were popularized
by the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA) which traces back to the seminal
work of Mundell (1961). The OCA is based on the standard model of the 1960s, the
classical Keynesian model. An excellent discussion regarding the implications of the
original OCA for the cost of joining the EMU can be found in Buiter (2000). For a
reconsideration of the OCA in modern micro-founded economic model, we suggest
Corsetti (2008). The results of Corsetti (2008) suggest that the cost of joining a
monetary union is of the same order of magnitude as that of fluctuations of the
business cycle.
Directly related to such considerations is the idea that fiscal policy can serve as a
substitute for national monetary policy and flexible exchange rates. This issue has
been a topic of constant academic debates for the last fifty years. Thus, it comes
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quite as a surprise that the European Commission (2008) based itself on strong
stabilizing effects of fiscal policy when proposing the European Economic Recovery
Plan (EERP) as a response to the economic crisis of 2007.
The European Commission (2008) presumed that certain fiscal instruments have ef-
fects on distinct macroeconomic variables, e.g. increased public consumption stim-
ulates domestic output or tax cuts targeted at households increase domestic private
demand. The OECD (2009) demonstrated at least the same degree of confidence
in the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Here, similar fiscal measures were suggested to
OECD members with the expectation that their implementation would not only
hold but reverse an upcoming recession.
Furthermore, the European Commission (2008) strongly encouraged to implement
expansive fiscal measures in all member countries at once in order to amplify the
benefits of fiscal stabilization by mutual spillovers within the EMU. This indicates
that the European Commission expected spillovers to an extent which would create
incentives for free-riding behavior.
European policymakers obviously display great confidence in the stabilizing powers
of fiscal policy. However, to develop a theoretical model which captures the key
characteristics of fiscal policy, a summary of empirical findings is required in order
to confront the demonstrated trust in individual measures with empirical evidence.
Today, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of the SGP is scarce. The most
important reason are limitations in available data, mainly due to the short time-
series since the EMU is a relatively young currency area. Gali and Perotti (2003)
address the question to which extent the SGP constraints fiscal policy. They reach
the result that fiscal policy has become more counter-cyclical in the time periods
that follow the SGP introduction. However, this is also true for member countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) outside
the EMU.
A similar result and a comprehensive survey of related literature can be found in
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von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008). But, although they extend the sample period as
compared to the Gali and Perotti (2003) analysis, they do no contrast their findings
to countries outside the EU. Therefore, it cannot be inferred whether the improved
quality of fiscal policy is due to the SGP or not.
Regarding spillovers of fiscal expansions among EU member states, Beetsma et al.
(2006) find that fiscal expansions boost economic activity in the implementing coun-
try and have positive spillover effects on its trading partners. In particular, this
holds in cases where the implementing country is a large trading partner. Thus, one
should expect substantial spillovers among the members of the EMU as they are
highly integrated by both, the single European market and a common currency.
The national effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables, such as consump-
tion and output are a prospering area of empirical research. The work of Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2005, 2009)
are the seminal contributions in this field with numerous studies following up.
However, the latter literature is strongly focused on identifying fiscal shocks from
data on the spending side of public budgets. With the exception of Ramey and
Shapiro (1998), public consumption shocks are empirically defined by including gov-
ernment spending on goods and services as well as public investment.
A notable exception of this common practice is Mountford and Uhlig (2005, 2009)
who identify fiscal shocks by looking at both the revenue and spending side of the
government budget. Their approach allows them to distinguish between balanced
budget changes in public spending, deficit spending and debt-financed tax cuts.
We should not a priory assume that the financing decision of the government has
no effects on how fiscal shocks affect the economy. Thus, such an approach seems
to be highly advisable. Mountford and Uhlig (2005, 2009) find that the responses
of consumption and output depend on the type of the fiscal shock and the financing
decision.
Finally, the empirical question remains how fiscal policy is conducted in practice.
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More precisely, whether and how fiscal policy interacts with the state of the econ-
omy, e.g. if fiscal policy responds to the state of public finances represented by
current budget deficits and the accumulated stock of public liabilities.
The standard approach to tackle these questions empirically is to estimate fiscal
policy rules. Gali and Perotti (2003) find that public spending responds to the state
of public finances. Regarding the instruments chosen to balance public budgets and
to decrease the level of public liabilities, empirical literature identifies cuts in public
budgets as the predominant approach throughout.
Alesina and Perotti (1996) and von Hagen et al. (2001) explore the issue and find
no empirical support for short run fluctuations in tax rates. Instead they find that
successful consolidations were mostly based on spending cuts. A similar result is
obtained by Corsetti et al. (2009) who find that increases in public spending are
followed by decreases below trend, so-called spending reversals.
Generally, the empirical literature suggests that the SGP did not substantially alter
the conduct of fiscal policy in the member countries of the EMU if compared to
countries outside the currency union. Moreover, empirical estimations of the effects
of fiscal policy lead to the conclusion that these depend on the choice of instruments
and the financing decision of the government. For the case of an increase in pub-
lic consumption, the empirical literature converges to the conclusion that domestic
output, consumption and employment rise. The spillovers of fiscal expansions are
most likely positive, at least among countries which participate in highly integrated
common markets.
Also, empirical literature suggests that fiscal policy works through a wide variety
of measures which are affecting the spending and revenue side of the government
budget. Fiscal policy is endogenous and responds to the state of public finances.
Regarding the choice of instruments in practice as to respond to deteriorating pub-
lic finances, the empirical literature finds little evidence for frequent changes in tax
rates. Instead, respective literature obtains the result that cuts in public budgets
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are at least as important as tax increases to keep public deficits and the stock of
public liabilities in a sustainable state.
We summarize that the empirical literature lends some support to the idea of fiscal
stabilization policies as advocated by the European Commission (2008).
A classical, but still influential theoretical approach to fiscal policy is the Keyne-
sian model based on the highly regarded work of Keynes (1936), see e.g. Wohltmann
(2005) for a detailed discussion. The Keynesian model is a closed economy approach
explicitly designed for short run analysis. The model assumes that prices are fixed
and households do not engage in intertemporal optimization but consume their cur-
rent income. Aggregate demand in the Keynesian model consists of consumption
and investment demand from the private sector and purely dissipative public con-
sumption.
Though fiscal policy in the Keynesian model is restricted to public consumption,
the model allows for a comparison of alternative financing decisions, namely the
issuance of central bank money or public debt and taxation.
The Keynesian model predicts that increases in public spending always stimulates
aggregate demand. However, it does not always trigger the famous Keynesian mul-
tiplier effect in terms of an increase of aggregate output by more than one-to-one.
The Keynesian multiplier on public spending is above unity if the increase in public
demand is financed by accumulating public debt or by money printing. However,
for cases of tax-financed increases in government spending, the multiplier on output
is smaller than one.
This leads us to the conclusion that the still influential Keynesian model provides
for an explanation for the conception of a debt-financed increase in public spending
in view of increasing the overall economic activity in times of distress. The second
lesson from the Keynesian approach is that debt and taxation are no equivalent
financing instruments.
The workhorse of modern macroeconomics is the dynamic general equilibrium
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(DGE) model, e.g. the classical RBC model (e.g. Baxter and King (1993)) as
well as standard new Keynesian models (e.g. Gali (2008)). These are based on the
intertemporal optimizing behavior of infinitely-lived agents. Obviously, such agents
are not so easily deceived by the issuance of public debt to prevent immediate tax in-
creases in order to finance fiscal expansions. They anticipate increases in future tax
bills implied by current debt-financed spending which is the Ricardian equivalence
property of DGE models. This model implies that debt and lump-sum taxation are
equivalent financing instruments.
Typically, fiscal policy enters the standard DGE model as an exogenous shock. An
increase in public demand always decreases permanent income of the private sector.
Households respond by adjusting their consumption plans downward and work more
to offset their income loss. Thus, an increase in public spending stimulates aggregate
demand but less than one-to-one as private demand is simultaneously decreased.
The characterizing properties of fiscal policy in standard models, which are the
restriction to dissipative public consumption, fiscal policy enters as an exogenous
process, the Ricardian equivalence property and, implied by that, a high variance
of tax rates, are difficult to reconcile with empirical evidence.
In response to these shortcomings a lively theoretical literature has emerged that
tries to move the predictions of DGE models closer to the empirical evidence. The
main focus of this literature is on the failure of theoretical models to predict expan-
sions of public consumption to crowd-in private demand and thus deliver Keynesian
output multipliers.
Here, the predominant theoretical approach was popularized by Gali et al. (2007)
who attempts to diminish the difference between the Keynesian model and its mod-
ern successors by distorting the intertemporal optimization behavior of households.
In Gali et al. (2007) , a fraction of households cannot participate in intertemporal
consumption-savings decisions as they have no access to capital markets. These so-
called rule-of-thumb consumers are forced to consume their current income similar
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to the households envisaged by the original Keynesian model. However, to obtain
crowding-in effects models need to assume a large share of rule-of-thumb consumers
which can hardly be confirmed by empirical evidence.
A priori it is not obvious that DGE models fail to predict crowding-in effects be-
cause of the intertemporal optimizing behavior of households. Among the model
characteristics at odds with the empirical findings there are the assumptions that
public spending is restricted to purely dissipative consumption of goods and that
fiscal policy is exogenous.
Linnemann and Schabert (2006) show that the introduction of productive govern-
ment spending in an otherwise standard new Keynesian model enables fiscal expan-
sions to crowd-in private demand.
Corsetti et al. (2009) model an endogenous response of public consumption to the
state of public finances. They find that increases in public consumption above trend
potentially crowd-in household consumption if they are subsequently financed ,at
least partially, by future decreases in public spending below trend, so-called spend-
ing reversals.
The theoretical work related to the formation of the EMU is focused on other issues
such as the potential problems arising from the institutional framework which pits
one common central bank versus seventeen sovereign fiscal authorities.
Prominent examples are Beetsma and Jensen (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2008).
Both study whether there are welfare gains from the co-ordination of fiscal policy or
not. However, the results are inconclusive as Beetsma and Jensen (2005) find con-
siderable gains from fiscal stabilization and the coordination of fiscal policy, while
these are small in Gali and Monacelli (2008).
Finally, we are aware of only one paper attempting to estimate the impact of fiscal
stabilization policies suggested by the EERP. Cwik and Wieland (2010) focus on the
impact of an exogenous increase in public consumption which is financed by future
taxation and find no support for the use of public consumption as an instrument to
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boost aggregate demand in standard new Keynesian models.
However, according to the OECD (2009), in the majority of member countries tax
cuts where preferred over increasing public spending.
We conclude that the theoretical literature related to the conduct of fiscal policy is
focused on the effects of exogenous changes in public consumption. The main route
taken to reconcile theory and empirical evidence is to extend standard DGE models
to allow for failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
However, researchers typically need to assume deviations from the paradigm of
intertemporally optimizing agents which cannot be confirmed empirically either.
Thus, the predominant approach to move the predictions of standard DGE models
closer to empirical findings contradicts another strand of empirical research.
Promising alternative extensions of theoretical models such as extending the set of
fiscal policy instruments by introducing productive government spending or allowing
for alternative financing decisions such as spending reversals are an exception.
Moreover, theoretical literature that features a more realistic approach to fiscal pol-
icy, compared to the standard DGE approach, in a model of a monetary union is
scarce. Existing models are focused on institutional issues such as the coordination
of monetary and fiscal policy.
This thesis consists of three chapters and aims to help closing this gap in the theo-
retical literature. Throughout, we employ standard new Keynesian models that are
augmented by the introduction of overlapping generations (OLG) of the Blanchard
(1985)-Yaari (1965) type.
Such a framework allows us to introduce uncertain lifetimes and thus failures of
the Ricardian equivalence by a single parameter γ, which stands for the survival
probability of households. A value of γ < 1 adds a wealth channel to the model that
enables to use fiscal policy to affect household consumption by the intertemporal
redistribution of income.
The first chapter presents an analytically tractable two-country model of a currency
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union. We abstract from distortions other than sticky prices in the goods market
and failures of the Ricardian equivalence. We assume that the government chooses
a certain level of public spending and decides on how to finance it where the choice
is between public debt and taxation.
Our main objective is to explore the transmission of various fiscal measures in a
theoretical model of a monetary union.
We find that, depending on the financing decision of the government, fiscal pol-
icy measures can have very different effects on key macroeconomic variables such
as consumption and output. The spillovers of national fiscal policy depend on the
composition of government spending, the type of the fiscal measure and the cross-
country substitutability between goods.
In chapter one, we also find that using debt as a policy instrument can be welfare
improving and have stimulating effects on consumption as well as output at the
same time.
In the second chapter we take a step backwards by restricting our attention to a
closed economy model. We employ a new Keynesian model that features an over-
lapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type as well as
sticky wages and prices. Moreover, we extend our model by allowing for public and
private investment which requires us to solve the model numerically.
This approach permits to extend the analysis of fiscal shocks in two different di-
mensions: Firstly, the array of fiscal instruments is increased by public investment.
Secondly, we assume a constant level of public spending which is financed by dis-
tortionary taxation in the model equilibrium.
The government is able to decide to either spending-side measures, i.e. cuts in public
consumption, or to improve public revenues in order to finance a temporary fiscal
expansion. Up to our best knowledge, we are the first comparing public consump-
tion and investment as well as tax cuts assuming alternative financing schemes.
We then ask whether such an extension of the set of fiscal measures does allow us
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to move the theoretical predictions closer to the empirical evidence.
We compare various fiscal instruments deployed in response to the recent economic
downturn and focus on the response of output, consumption and hours worked. We
find that both, the financing decision as well as possible failures of the Ricardian
equivalence have a large impact on how fiscal measures affect key macroeconomic
variables. Our results suggest that a single deviation from the standard model, e.g.
failures of the Ricardian equivalence, is not sufficient to reconcile theory and empir-
ical evidence.
Moreover, our result supports the policy advice of the OECD (2009) that also em-
phasizes the importance of the financing decision of the government.
The last chapter builds on the findings of chapter 2 and develops the issue further
by extending the model to a two-country model of a currency union. The solution
approach inherited from chapter two does not allow us to obtain quantitative pre-
dictions in terms of the impact of alternative fiscal policy measures, still, the model
enables us to derive qualitative results in a framework that matches the respective
empirical evidence.
We focus on fiscal measures that are frequently employed in practice by assessing
the impact of central components of the EERP on the economy of the implement-
ing country as well as the implied spillovers. We explore whether the fiscal policy
measures suggested by the EERP have the effects envisaged by the European Com-
mission in our theoretical model.
Up to our best knowledge, ours is the first approach which compares public consump-
tion and investment as well as tax cuts by assuming alternative financing schemes
in a full-fledged two-country model of a monetary union.
The European Commission expected specific fiscal measures to be effective instru-
ments to stabilize important macroeconomic variables. The expectation that in-
creased public consumption stimulates national output or that tax cuts are appro-
priate tools to strengthen household demand are examples for this kind of thinking.
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Our model lends support to this view as we find that an increase in public consump-
tion does always increase national output.
But, the expansionary effect depends on the financing strategy of the government
as well as on the degree of deviations from Ricardian behavior. In general, financing
temporary increases in public consumption by future spending cuts is more powerful
in terms of its effect on output. However, to obtain Keynesian multiplier effects we
need to assume deviations from Ricardian behavior to an extend which cannot be
confirmed empirically.
We find that tax cuts targeted at households do, under certain conditions, have
the potential to stabilize private consumption demand. The Ricardian equivalence
prevents lump-sum subsidies which are financed by future increases in lump-sum
taxation to have any effect on household consumption.
However, this measure does affect household consumption if we deviate from this
assumption either by assuming finite lifespans or an alternative financing decision
in terms of future spending cuts.
The European Commission expected increases in public investment to strengthen
aggregate demand in the short run and to improve the aggregate supply by increased
productivity. Our model confirms these expectations independently of the assumed
financing strategy or failures the Ricardian equivalence.
Regarding the expected spillovers of fiscal policy, we find that these are always pos-
itive in the medium term. However, in a monetary union a common central bank is
ill-equipped to respond to asymmetric shocks. Thus, in case of a fiscal policy shock
in one country of the union, monetary policy at union level is too dovish for the
implementing country and too restrictive for the remaining members, generally the
degree of this divergence increases with the size of the country which implements
the fiscal stimulus.
Finally, we briefly summarize the main results of all three chapters. In general,
fiscal policy enters theoretical models in the form of exogenous changes in public
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consumption. Extending otherwise standard new Keynesian models by a fraction
of households that consume their income in a hand-to-mouth fashion, i.e. the in-
troduction of failures of the Ricardian equivalence is the predominant approach to
reconcile theory and empirical evidence in the literature. Such role-of-thumb con-
sumers are close to the original setting of the classical Keynesian model.
Subsequently, the assumption of a sufficiently large fraction of non-Ricardian con-
sumers enables an increase in private consumption in response to a rise in public
consumption and thus, Keynesian multiplier effects.
By introducing an overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari
(1965), we followed a similar approach in each chapter. In addition, we extended
the range of fiscal instruments both on the spending and revenue side of the public
budget and assumed that fiscal policy is not exogenous, but rather responds to the
state of public finances.
We find that failures of the Ricardian equivalence yield theoretical predictions that
are close to empirical evidence. However, this comes at the price of deviating from
the Ricardian equivalence in a way that cannot be confirmed empirically.
We find that the introduction of a more complex fiscal sector and the assumption
that fiscal policy is endogenous allows us to move theoretical predictions closer to
the empirical evidence without having to rely crucially on deviations from Ricardian
behavior.
We conclude that focusing on distortions in intertemporal optimization and exoge-
nous fiscal policy is a too narrow approach to tackle with research questions related
to the conduct and effects of fiscal policy in theoretical models.
In each chapter, the chosen fiscal instrument as well as the financing decision of the
government matter regarding the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables.
In a monetary union, the national conduct of fiscal policy affects all member coun-
tries in various ways. We observe spillovers from fiscal policy together with effects
on monetary policy which does not respond to national variables but targets union-
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wide averages.
A natural next step would be the estimation of our model using European data. This
follow-up work would lead to quantitative predictions regarding the national effects
as well as the spillovers of fiscal policy. Extending the range of fiscal instruments
further by including distortionary tax rates within the set of financing decisions, is
another step forward.
The precise distinction between fiscal instruments and the related financing decision
is crucial for the empirical validation of our results. In doing so, we suggest relying
on the approach of Mountford and Uhlig (2005, 2009) which we consider being well
suited to test the implications of our theoretical model.
14
Chapter 1
Fiscal policy transmission in a
non-Ricardian model of a
monetary union
1.1 Introduction
The formation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has raised a notable debate
on the role of fiscal policy within a currency union. The EMU membership comes
at the cost of loosing monetary autonomy and flexible exchange rates between the
member countries. It is the European Central Bank (ECB) that conducts monetary
policy on the union level. Its overwhelming objective is to stabilize the unionwide
price level.
However, there is no common fiscal authority in the EMU. The ECB is confronted
with several national governments taking independent fiscal decisions. The Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact (SGP) attempts to limit the member country’s annual new
indebtedness and the accumulated stock of government debt in the EMU. National
fiscal policy is constrained but it has to sufficiently respond to the state of public
finances to ensure the ECB’s ability to fulfill its obligation. This implies in terms
of design that monetary policy is active while fiscal policy is passive in the sense of
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Leeper (1991).
Yet, fiscal policy is the only flexible tool at the disposal of a member country’s
government to conduct short run stabilization policies on the national level. The
ECB is ill-equipped to respond to the needs of specific member countries. Moreover,
national fiscal policies do not leave the remaining members of the monetary union
unaffected as there are spillover effects of fiscal measures.
There is a scarcity of empirical evidence on fiscal spillovers and the effects of the
SGP. Gali and Perotti (2003) try to answer the question to which extend the SGP
constraints fiscal policy. They estimate fiscal rules for members of the EMU, mem-
bers of the European Union that are not part of the EMU and other members of
the OECD based on annual data. Gali and Perotti (2003) find that the SGP does
not constrain the fiscal policy decisions of EMU members compared to the other
countries in their sample.
Beetsma et al. (2006) estimate the spillovers from fiscal shocks via trade flows in
Europe. They find that fiscal expansions boost economic activity in the implement-
ing country and have positive spillover effects on its trading partners. Beetsma et
al. (2006) conclude that spillovers from fiscal policy are important. In particular, in
cases where the implementing country is a large trading partner.
The effects of fiscal policy on national variables such as consumption and output
is a more active field of empirical research. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate
the effects of shocks to taxes and government spending on household consumption
and output. They find that fiscal expansions have positive effects on output and
consumption, and an increase in taxation has opposite effects.
Mountford and Uhlig (2005) identify three different fiscal policy shocks: Balanced
budget changes in public spending, deficit spending and debt-financed tax cuts.
They find that the responses of consumption and output depend on the type of the
fiscal shock. In the aftermath of a balanced budget increase in public spending, out-
put and consumption fall. The depressing effect of the tax increase dominates the
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fiscal stimulus. Deficit spending stimulates output and consumption only weakly. A
debt-financed tax cut has a significant positive effect on consumption and output.
Mountford and Uhlig (2005) conclude the best fiscal stimulus is a debt-financed
tax cut. Both of the above mentioned studies apply VAR estimation techniques to
quarterly US data. Fiscal shocks are identified directly from the data.
An alternative strand of empirical literature, e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and
Ramey (2009), apply the so-called narrative approach. They identify fiscal measures
by studying contemporaneous press reports and focus on war expenses in so-called
Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Using annual US data, Ramey (2009) finds that increases
in public demand are partially offset by a negative response of consumption. Over-
all, they observe a small positive response of output.
This is not necessarily a contradiction to the empirical evidence from the VAR ap-
proach. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2005) emphasize
that it is the financing decision of the government that matters. The estimates of
Ramey (2009) which are based on a small number of observations with different
underlying financing decisions of the government support this notion. For a more
extensive discussion see Perotti (2007).
Surveys of the empirical literature can be found in Gali et al. (2007) and von Ha-
gen and Wyplosz (2008). We conclude that empirical evidence suggests that the
response of consumption and output to fiscal expansions depends on the financing
decisions of the government.
Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009) are promi-
nent examples for theoretical work on fiscal policy in a currency union. Beetsma
and Jensen (2005) explore the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in a
two-country DSGE model of a monetary union. Gali and Monacelli (2008) study
optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a DSGE model of a monetary union that
consists of a continuum of infinitesimally small open economies. There is also Fer-
rero (2009)’s model which is similar to Beetsma and Jensen (2005). He studies the
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optimal financing decision for a given level of public spending where the choice is
between distortionary taxation and public debt.
Beetsma and Jensen (2005) find considerable gains from fiscal stabilization and the
coordination of fiscal policy, while these are small in Gali and Monacelli (2008).
Both models feature infinitely-lived representative agents. Thus, the Ricardian
equivalence holds which implies that debt and taxation are equivalent financing
decisions of the government. Consequently, an increase of government spending fi-
nanced by (lump-sum) taxes, increases the demand for output and decreases private
consumption. The overall response of output is positive.
We conclude that the predominant modelling strategy is difficult to reconcile with
empirical evidence. This suggests not only a wider variety of fiscal measures but also
stipulates that the response of key macroeconomic variables depends on the precise
assumptions to the type of fiscal measure and the government’s financing decision.
Ferrero (2009) allows for distortionary taxation, i.e. failures of the Ricardian equiv-
alence. However, he explores the optimal choice between debt and distortionary
taxation to finance a given level of public spending. His result is that in case of
public spending which has to be financed by distortionary taxation, constraining
public debt is not optimal. Viewed against a welfare perspective, changes in the
level of the public debt stock induce less disutility than variations in distortionary
taxation.
Standard models contradict the empirical evidence as the financing decision does not
affect the transmission of fiscal policy. However, debt-financed increases in public
consumption and debt-financed tax cuts are among the measures frequently taken
to stimulate the economy. In particular, these policy measures were included in the
European Economic Recovery Plan suggested by the Commission of the European
Communities in 2008 and suggested by the OECD (2009) to halt and even reverse
the economic downturn in the wake of the financial crisis. Thus, practical policy
decisions are difficult to reconcile with standard modelling choices.
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Moreover, despite the SGP national governments in the EMU have substantial room
for fiscal maneuver. In particular, as the constraints of the Pact are not binding in
times of economic distress. In order to obtain meaningful theoretical predictions we
need to model not only the national effects but also the spillovers of fiscal policy
in accordance with the empirical evidence. Thus, we propose a two-country NOEM
model of a currency union featuring overlapping generations (OLG) of the Blan-
chard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type. This enables us to study a wider range of fiscal
measures including different ways of how to finance a given level of public spending.
Our model features failures of the Ricardian equivalence. Debt and taxation are not
equivalent policy instruments.
We assume that the government chooses a certain level of public spending and de-
cides on how to finance it. Depending on the financing decision, we are interested
in the effects of fiscal policy on national consumption and output as well as in the
spillovers. We abstract from distortions other than failures of the Ricardian equiv-
alence.
Our main objective is to explore the transmission of various fiscal measures in a
two-country model of a monetary union. We show that using debt as a policy in-
strument can be welfare improving and consumption as well as output stimulating
at the same time, even if alternative financing decisions are non-distortionary.
Moreover, Gali and Monacelli (2008) emphasize the empirical evidence for home
bias in public spending. In fact, the assumption of complete home bias in public
spending is common to all theoretical models mentioned above. We address the
issue by allowing for government spending with and without home bias and explore
the transmission of four different fiscal measures. These are temporary as well as
permanent balanced budget changes in public spending, deficit spending and a debt-
financed tax cut in the domestic country.
We find that the response of household consumption and output in the domestic
country and the spillovers on the foreign country depend on the precise type of the
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fiscal shock and the composition of government spending.
A balanced budget increase in public consumption always leads to a decrease in do-
mestic consumption and an increase in home production in the short and long run.
If the government spends exclusively on domestic goods, the spillover is negative
for all time horizons. If there is no home bias in public spending, the spillover is
reversed, and fiscal expansion enable higher consumption abroad.
Deficit spending has similar effects. However, these are weaker and depend on the
assumptions we make regarding the financing decision of the implementing govern-
ment. In particular, the intertemporal dispersion of the spending and financing
decision determine the effects of deficit-spending on household consumption and
utility. This is true for all debt-financed fiscal measures.
Finally, a debt-financed tax cut implies an increase in consumption at home and
abroad in the short run. Output increases in both countries. In the long run, do-
mestic households have to repay the accumulated public debt and suffer from a
decrease in net foreign assets. Foreign households benefit from the increased real
income while the opposite is true for the home country in the long run. Overall, our
positive results are close to the estimates of Mountford and Uhlig (2005).
The welfare effects of fiscal policy can also be very different. While balanced budget
changes in government spending always imply welfare losses which is not necessarily
true for debt-financed fiscal expansions. Thus, we conclude that the proposed mod-
elling strategy allows us to bring theoretical models closer to empirical evidence.
The other parts of the chapter are organized as follows. Section 1.2 sets out a two-
country Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG of a currency union. In section 1.3
we analyze the positive aspects of various fiscal policy measures including policy
transmission and spillover effects. We discuss the normative aspects of fiscal actions
in section 1.4. Finally, section 1.5 presents the conclusions and possible extensions
of the model.
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1.2 The Model
We develop a dynamic, two-country, general equilibrium model of a monetary union
with sticky prices and monopolistic competition in the goods market. Households
are introduced in the form of overlapping generations following the discrete-time
version of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG by Frenkel et al. (1996).
We identify one country as the domestic country H, while the other country is re-
ferred to as the foreign country F . In the domestic country, a cohort of n ∈ [0, 1]
households is born in each period whereas (1− n) agents are born abroad. All
agents face a constant probability of death (1− γ) in each period. Therefore, the
population in the domestic country is
∑∞
a=0 γ
an = n
1−γ and
1−n
1−γ is the population
abroad. This implies a constant world population that is normalized to one.
Households have no bequest motive. Finite lifespans imply that an intertempo-
ral redistribution of wealth potentially changes the expected permanent income in
the remaining lifespan of an individual and thus, leads to failures of the Ricardian
equivalence.
1.2.1 Households
Domestic households share identical preferences and maximize their utility over
consumption C, real balances M
P
and leisure (1 − L). The certainty equivalent
utility function of an individual domestic household reads
Ut =
∞∑
s=t
(γβ)
s−t
[
lnCa+s−t,s + χ ln
(
Ma+s−t,s
Ps
)
+ ψ ln (1− La+s−t,s)
]
(1.1)
where β, χ, ψ > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to survive until the next period.
Preferences are homothetic and additively separable over consumption, real balances
and leisure. The household’s endowment of time in each period is normalized to
one, therefore (1− L) , L ∈ [0, 1] denotes leisure. The parameter ψ > 0 measures
the utility of time spent out of work.
The individual real flow budget constraint of a domestic household of age a reads
Fa,t+1 +
Ma,t
Pt
+ Ca,t =
1
γ
[
Ma−1,t−1
Pt
+ (1 + rt)Fa−1,t
]
+
Wa,t
Pt
La,t +
Πt
Pt
− Tt (1.2)
where W is the nominal wage, F denotes the agents total asset holdings, T is a
lump-sum tax and rt the real interest rate known at t−1 and paid on bond holdings
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between t − 1 and t. Households owe a portfolio of bonds denominated in units of
the composite consumption good and issued either by the national government or
households abroad.
Πt
Pt
= pit(h)(1−γ) is the per-capita share of the profit of domestic producers received
by an domestic individual. We assume that households receive an equal share of
national profits independent of age1.
Productivity and consumption preferences are assumed to be independent of age.
This allows us to calculate per-capita variables by aggregating across ages and then
dividing by population size. Individual and per-capita variables coincide in the
model. Variables without age a index denote per-capita values. The domestic
households optimizing behavior yields the consumption function
Ct =
1− γβ
1 + χ+ ψ
TWt (1.3)
where the coefficient 1−γβ
1+χ+ψ
is the agent’s marginal propensity to consume out of
total wealth. Domestic per-capita demand for real balances is given by
Mt
Pt
= χ
1 + it+1
it+1
Ct (1.4)
where i denotes the nominal interest rate which is symmetric across countries and
equal to the real interest rate plus expected inflation,
Lt = 1− κ Pt
Wt
Ct (1.5)
is the labor-leisure trade-off equation and
Ct+1 =
(
1− γβ
1 + χ+ ψ
)
(1− γ)Ht+1 + (1 + rt+1)γβCt (1.6)
the Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption. We
define
Ht =
∞∑
s=t
αs,tγ
s−t
[
Ws
Ps
+
Πs
Ps
− τs
]
with αs,t =
 αs,t = 1 if s = tαs,t = 1(1+rt+1)·...·(1+rt+s) if s > t (1.7)
where α is the present value factor as the human wealth and
TWt =
1
γ
(
1
1 + it
Mt−1
Pt−1
+ Ft
)
(1 + rt) +Ht (1.8)
as the total wealth in per-capita terms. Human wealth is the present discounted
value of gross earnings net of taxes over the expected lifespan of households. Total
wealth is the sum of financial and human wealth. We assume that each country in the
world economy specializes in the production of one type of good. For each type there
1A representative domestic producer earns pit(h). Aggregating across domestic producers we
obtain npit(h), dividing by the population size
n
1−γ yields pit(h)(1−γ) the share of domestic profits
received by any domestic agent independent of age.
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exists a continuum of brands. We describe the behavior of an individual domestic
household with the notion that similar equations hold for foreign households. The
consumption basket of an domestic individual of age a reads
Ca,t =
[
n
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H,a,t + (1− n)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F,a,t
] θ
θ−1
(1.9)
where
CH,a,t =
(
n−
1
φ
∫ n
0
ca,t(h)
φ−1
φ dh
) φ
φ−1
CF,a,t =
(
(1− n)− 1φ
∫ 1
n
ca,t(f)
φ−1
φ df
) φ
φ−1
(1.10)
Following Tille (2001) we refer to θ as the cross-country substitutability. φ > 1, θ <
φ is the within-country substitutability which is assumed to be symmetric across
countries.
The corresponding consumer price index is defined as the minimum expenditure to
buy one unit of the composite consumption good which is given by
Pt = P
∗
t =
[
nP 1−θH,t + (1− n)P 1−θF,t
] 1
1−θ
(1.11)
where
PH,t ≡
(
1
n
∫ n
0
pt(h)
1−φdh
) 1
1−φ
PF,t ≡
(
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
pt(f)
1−φdf
) 1
1−φ
(1.12)
We assume no impediments to trade. Hence, the law of one price p(h) = p∗(h)
holds for every single good. Home and foreign agents are assumed to have symmetric
preferences which are invariant across ages. Throughout, we assume that n = 0.5.
Thus, the law of one price, together with the consumption-based CPI implies that
P = P ∗ holds in every period as the two countries in the world economy share a
common currency. An asterisk denotes a foreign country variable.
The terms of trade (TOT) are defined as the ratio of the price of a domestically
produced consumption bundle and a bundle of goods produced abroad.
TOT =
PH
PF
(1.13)
From the domestic household’s point of view, an increase in the TOT is an improve-
ment. A higher price of domestically produced goods enables a higher consumption
of foreign brands.
Each individual domestic household maximizes his utility from consumption given
his budget in any period of time. This optimizing behavior results in the following
individual demand functions for brands h, f
ca,t(h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−φ(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Ca,t ca,t(f) =
(
pt(f)
PF,t
)−φ(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Ca,t (1.14)
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1.2.2 The monetary and fiscal authorities
We focus on fiscal policy. To facilitate the analysis, we assume that the common
central bank is only obliged to keep the world money stock constant.
National governments act as individual entities. They decide on the level of public
spending and how to finance it. Due to failures of the Ricardian equivalence in the
model, debt and taxation are not equivalent instruments. Government spending on
goods and debt services can be financed either by lump-sum taxation or by issuing
new debt according to the period budget identity
Gt + (1 + rt)Dt = Tt +Dt+1 (1.15)
and the usual no-Ponzi game condition. D denotes the real stock of public debt.
We assume that the government’s real consumption index takes the same form as
that of households
Gt =
[
n
1
θG
θ−1
θ
H,t + (1− n)
1
θG
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
(1.16)
where
GH,t =
(
n−
1
φ
∫ n
0
gt(h)
φ−1
φ dh
) φ
φ−1
GF,t =
(
(1− n)− 1φ
∫ 1
n
gt(f)
φ−1
φ df
) φ
φ−1
(1.17)
The latter assumption implies that there is no home bias in government spending
on goods.
However, Gali and Monacelli (2008) emphasizes that there is empirical evidence for
home bias in public spending. In fact, the assumption of complete home bias in gov-
ernment consumption is predominant in the literature on fiscal policy in monetary
unions. Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009)
are examples for this practice. This modelling decision mirrors the validity of the
Ricardian equivalence. Fiscal policy becomes less powerful if it falls equally on all
goods produced in the world economy. If there is no home bias in Ricardian models,
there is no scope for fiscal policy interaction between the members of a monetary
union.
Thus, to facilitate the comparison of our results with the existing literature, we
modify our model to allow for complete home bias in government spending. All
assumptions are maintained except the real consumption indices of the home and
foreign governments which take the following form
Ghb,H,t =
(
n−
1
φ
∫ n
0
ghb,t(h)
φ−1
φ dh
) φ
φ−1
G∗hb,F,t =
(
(1− n)− 1φ
∫ 1
n
g∗hb,t(f)
φ−1
φ df
) φ
φ−1
(1.18)
consequently the domestic period budget identity becomes
PH,t
Pt
Ghb,H,t + (1 + rt)Dt = Tt +Dt+1 (1.19)
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1.2.3 The current account
The current account equation is derived from the government budget constraint
together with the budget constraint of the private sector. The resulting current
account equation in the basic model reads
Vt+1 − Vt = φ− 1
φ
pt(h)
Pt
Lt − Ct −Gt + Πt
Pt
+ rtVt (1.20)
where V = F − D denotes the net foreign assets position in a given period. If
we assume complete home bias in government consumption the domestic current
account becomes
Vt+1 − Vt = φ− 1
φ
pt(h)
Pt
Lt − Ct − PH,t
Pt
Ghb,H,t +
Πt
Pt
+ rtVt (1.21)
In the aggregate, we assume that nV +(1− n)V ∗ = 0 holds in any period and both
cases.
1.2.4 Technology and production
There is a measure one of infinitely lived firms in the world economy of which h ∈
[0, n] reside in the home country and f ∈ (n, 1] abroad. A representative domestic
producer h takes the demand for his production as given. We assume a linear
production technology Yt(h) = Lt. Firms operate under monopolistic competition
at the goods market while there is perfect competition at the labor market. The
demand curve facing each domestic producer is
ydt (h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−θ (
PH,t
Pt
)−ρ
[Cwt +G
w
t ] (1.22)
where Cwt = nCt + (1−n)C∗t and Gwt = nGt + (1−n)G∗t are the global private and
public demand for consumption goods. If the government spends only on national
goods the demand curve facing the typical domestic producer becomes
ydt (h) =
(
pt(h)
PH,t
)−φ [(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Cwt + nGhb,H,t
]
(1.23)
A typical domestic producer sets its price pt(h) to maximize the stream of revenues
at any t which yields the following mark-up pricing rule
pt(h) =
θ
θ − 1Wt (1.24)
In a symmetric equilibrium all national producers choose the same price to maximize
the stream of revenues at any t.
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1.2.5 The initial steady state
The model has no closed-form solution. The solution technique is to log-linearize
around an initial steady state and then solve the resulting system of equations in
relative terms. For a detailed discussion of this approach see Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995, 1996).
We assume a fully symmetric initial steady state where the net foreign assets V0 =
V ∗0 = 0, government spending G0 = G
∗
0 = 0 and the stock of government debt D0 =
D∗0 = 0. Prices are set symmetric in each country and across borders PH,0 = PF,0,
supply equals demand on the world goods market.
Fiscal policy enters the model as an exogenous shock. The variety of fiscal measures
includes changes in the level of government spending, debt and the levied lump-sum
taxation.
We follow the timing assumptions of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996). Prices are
pre-set and fixed for one period. The model’s response to an exogenous shock spans
over three periods. In the initial steady state (period 0) no shock has occurred and
prices are set for the subsequent period. In the model short run (period 1) prices
are fixed and a shock hits the economy, whereby all other variables are allowed
to adjust. From period 2 onwards, in the model’s long run prices adjust and a
new steady state is reached. The model will remain in equilibrium, provided no
additional shocks occur.
1.2.6 The log-linearized model equations
The steady state of the model is fully characterized by the log linearized
consumption-based CPI, the demand schedules for domestic/foreign products, the
labor-leisure trade-off, Euler equations, human wealth, demand for real balances,
government budget constraints and the current account equations for the home and
foreign country which are presented below. Throughout lower case letters denote
the log-linear approximation of a variable. R0 = 1 + r0 ist the real interest rate in
the initial steady state.
pt = p
∗
t = npH,t + (1− n)pF,t (1.25)
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lt = −ψ φ
φ− 1 (ct + pt − pH,t) l
∗
t = −ψ
φ
φ− 1 (c
∗
t + pt − pF,t) (1.26)
ct+1 =
1− γβ
1 + χ+ ψ
(1− γ)(1 + ψ)
(
R0
R0 − γ
)
ht+1 + γβR0ct + γβ(R0 − 1)rt+1
c∗t+1 =
1− γβ
1 + χ+ ψ
(1− γ)(1 + ψ)
(
R0
R0 − γ
)
h∗t+1 + γβR0c
∗
t + γβ(R0 − 1)rt+1
(1.27)
ht+1 = − (pt+1 − pH,t+1) + 1
φ(1 + ψ)
yt+1 − γ
R0 − γRt+1 −
1
1 + ψ
tt+1
h∗t+1 = − (pt+1 − pF,t+1) +
1
φ(1 + ψ)
y∗t+1 −
γ
R0 − γRt+1 −
1
1 + ψ
t∗t+1
(1.28)
mt − pt = ct − rt+1
R0
− pt+1 − pt
R0 − 1 m
∗
t − p∗t = c∗t −
rt+1
R0
− pt+1 − pt
R0 − 1 (1.29)
gt = tt + dt+1 −R0dt g∗t = t∗t + d∗t+1 −R0d∗t (1.30)
yt = θ (pt − pH,t) + cwt + gwt y∗t = θ (pt − pF,t) + cwt + gwt (1.31)
vt+1 − vt = (R0 − 1)vt − gt + yt + pH,t − pt − ct
v∗t+1 − v∗t = (R0 − 1)v∗t − g∗t + y∗t + pH,t − pt − c∗t
(1.32)
where nv + (1 − n)v∗ = 0. To analyze the transmission of fiscal policy under
complete home bias, here again we use the system (1.25)-(1.30). However, the log
linearized demand schedules and the current account equations are altered by the
assumption of complete home bias in government spending and presented below.
yt = θ (pt − pH,t) + cwt + nghb,H,t y∗t = θ (pt − pF,t) + cwt + (1− n)g∗hb,F,t (1.33)
vt+1 − vt = (R0 − 1)vt − ghb,H,t + yt + pH,t − pt − ct
v∗t+1 − v∗t = (R0 − 1)v∗t − g∗hb,F,t + y∗t + pH,t − pt − c∗t
(1.34)
1.3 Positive analysis
Applying the timing assumptions x0 denotes a variable in the initial steady state,
the short run value of a variable carries no index and x¯ refers to the long run value
of a variable. The solution of the models provides for the endogenous variables as
functions of exogenous variables in relative terms.
We can also solve for the levels of home and foreign variables by utilizing Aoki
(1981)’s formula. The level of a home/foreign variable is given by
x = xw + (1− n) (x− x∗) x∗ = xw − n (x− x∗) (1.35)
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Aoki (1981)’s formulas decompose the effect of a policy shock in the effect on
the global variable and a relative effect whose weight depends on the size of the
countries. This allows us to consider changes in the levels of endogenous variables
as consumption or output without solving explicitly for the reduced forms. And
thus, a discussion of the effects of national fiscal policy changes on the levels of
domestic variables and the spill-over on foreign variables.
Finally, we can show that the long run world levels of consumption and output are
not affected by the accumulated stocks of public debt
c¯w = − φ− 1
(ψ + 1)φ− 1 g¯
w y¯w =
ψφ
(ψ + 1)φ− 1 g¯
w (1.36)
but are functions of public spending decisions in the home country and abroad. This
is also true under the assumption of complete home bias in government spending
c¯w = − φ− 1
(ψ + 1)φ− 1
(
n2g¯H + (1− n)2g¯∗F
)
y¯w =
ψφ
(ψ + 1)φ− 1
(
n2g¯H + (1− n)2g¯∗F
)
(1.37)
We explore the international transmission of fiscal policy shocks in a monetary union
apart from balanced budget policies. We conduct a number of policy experiments
involving different ways of financing a given level of government expenditures. Fur-
thermore, we undertake a comparison of temporary or permanent changes in public
spending. The monetary policy is delegated to a common monetary authority.
We analyze a debt-financed tax cut, deficit spending and a temporary or permanent
balanced budget increase in domestic government spending. Moreover, we explore
the spillover effects of fiscal measures within a monetary union.
1.3.1 Balanced-budget changes in government spending
Consider a permanent increase in domestic public consumption g0 < g = g¯ by one
percent measured in terms of domestic output in the initial steady state. The fiscal
expansion is financed by an equal increase in taxation t = t¯ > t0. Following the
literature for now, we assume complete home bias in government spending.
In response, domestic households decrease their demand for consumption goods.
Private consumption demand (1.3) is a function of current and future total wealth.
A permanent increase in taxation reduces the household’s disposable income over
all time horizons. We label this the direct wealth effects of fiscal policy.
In the short run the labor-leisure trade off does not bind and output is demand
determined. Domestic households benefit from this effect by increased dividend
payments and labor income. We refer to this as the indirect wealth effect of fiscal
policy. Overall, the direct wealth effect dominates. Domestic households reduce
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Figure 1.1: A permanent balanced-budget increase of government spending.
their demand for home and foreign goods.
Domestic output is increased one-to-one by public spending. Consumption demand
by domestic households is decreased but less than the increase in taxation. This is
partly explained by household consumption smoothing behavior and partly because
the increase in taxation is offset by the indirect wealth effects in the short run.
The demand for foreign output is decreased compared to the initial steady state.
Foreign households receive lower dividend payments and labor income and reduce
their demand for consumption goods.
The relative solutions for consumption, output and the current account in the short
run are given by
c− c∗ = γEU
γβω + γcc
(d¯− d¯∗)− γcc
γβω − γcc [(1− n)gH − ng
∗
F ]
− γcc
γβR0 + γcc(R0 − 1)
[
(1− nγgg) g¯hb,H − (1− (1− n)γgg) g¯∗hb,F
] (1.38)
y − y∗ = nghb,H − (1− n)g∗hb,F (1.39)
v¯ = −(1− n)

γEU
γcc + γβω
(d¯− d¯∗)−
[
γcc
γβω + γcc
− 1
]
[(1− n)gH − ng∗F ]
+
γcc
γβR0 + γcc(R0 − 1) [(1− nγgg)g¯H − (1− (1− n)γgg)g¯
∗
F ]
 (1.40)
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Figure 1.2: A temporary balanced-budget increase of government spending.
where γEU =
1−γβ
1+χ+κ
(1 − γ) R0
R0−1 , ω =
R0
R0−1 , γgg =
[
1+ψΦ
θ+ψΦ
− γEU
γcc
(
Ψ
θ+ψΦ
+ 1
φ
)]
,
γcc =
ρ+κ θ
θ−1(1−γEU(κ+1− ρθ ))
ρ(1+κ θθ−1)
and d¯ = 1
R0−1 t¯.
The marginal response of a relative variable to exogenous shocks is derived by taking
the first order conditions and adding the partial effects. To provide some intuition,
we illustrate our policy experiments with numerical examples2. Fig. 1.1 gives the
marginal response of short run relative consumption, the current account as well as
the relative consumption, output and the terms of trade in the long run to a perma-
nent balanced-budget increase in public spending as functions of the cross-country
substitutability.
If government spending is biased towards national products, a permanent balanced-
budget increase induces two asymmetries. Firstly, the composition of public spend-
ing differs from that of household demand and determines the indirect wealth effects.
Secondly, the direct wealth effects due to changes in taxation. The tax burden falls
exclusively on domestic households. The response of relative consumption is nega-
tive in the short run.
2The numerical examples given in figure 1.1-1.4 are based on the following parametrization:
β = 0.99, ψ = 1, χ = 0.1, φ = 6, γ = 0.7 and n = 0.5. We vary the cross-country substitutability
θ ∈ [0.1, 6].
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As public spending affects only domestic output, the response of relative output is
strictly positive. The current account effect of fiscal policy depends on the house-
hold income in the long run. Households smooth consumption over time.
A well-known feature of two-country general equilibrium models is the so-called ex-
penditure switching. It reflects the intratemporal optimizing behavior of households
in demand for home and foreign output. Households maximize their consumption
in each period of time. The allocation of demand between home and foreign prod-
ucts depends on their relative prices. Domestic households will substitute foreign
for domestic goods if the TOT improve. However, in a MU under the given timing
assumptions the TOT are fixed in the short run. Changes in the TOT are deferred
to the long run.
Households anticipate the long run effects of fiscal measures and adjust their behav-
ior. In the symmetric initial steady state, the weights of home and foreign products
in the household’s consumption basket correspond to the relative size of the coun-
tries. In the long run, depending on the degree of cross-country substitutability
between goods and the change in the TOT, this is not necessarily true.
The response of relative consumption and the current account are functions of the
survival probability γ and the cross-country substitutability. We follow Tille (2001)
and assume θ < φ. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods
is smaller than within groups of national brands.
However, a wide range of assumptions with regard to the cross- and within-country
elasticity of substitution can be found in the literature. Empirically, the estimates
of the cross-country substitutability vary between θ ∈ [0.2, 6], for a recent discussion
see Corsetti et al. (2008).
In a series of papers, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001, 2005) and Corsetti (2006) show
that in a Ricardian two-country model with flexible exchange rates, the assumption
of θ = 1 < φ implies that all adjustment to exogenous shocks is determined by
changes in the TOT. This finding is very robust. It holds under monetary and fiscal
shocks. The assumption of home bias in private consumption demand and is also
true in our model for γ = 1. Otherwise, the Corsetti-Pesenti result does not hold.
A permanent increase of domestic government spending implies that the domestic
government absorbs a fraction of domestic output. The supply of domestic goods
at the world market is decreased and the overall production in the home country
as well as on the world level increased. The price of domestic output at the world
market is increased in the long run and the TOT improve.
By exploiting the relative price improvement in the long run, domestic households
have the opportunity to obtain more foreign output per unit of domestic production.
However, the permanent direct wealth effect diminishes the level of real income of
domestic households. They have to work more and consume less to pay the higher
tax rate. In the long run, the labor-leisure trade off binds. Households maximize
their consumption of goods and leisure. They substitute foreign for domestic goods
as to enjoy more leisure.
The described mechanism implies that foreign goods are substitutes for domestic
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output in the consumption basket of the domestic household. Thus, the cross-
country substitutability determines the scope for expenditure switching. In general,
households will exploit improvements in the TOT until they have reached the point
where the utility loss induced by deviations from the initial steady state consump-
tion basket equals the utility gains from the corresponding increase in leisure.
Following Tille (2001) we differentiate two cases. Home and foreign goods are poor
substitutes (θ < 1 if γ = 1) and home and foreign goods are close substitutes (θ > 1
if γ = 1). For the Corsetti-Pesenti threshold, θ = 1, γ = 1, the current account is
balanced and all adjustment is done by changes in the TOT.
If home and foreign goods are poor substitutes, domestic households cannot exploit
improvements of the TOT. The disutility induced by deviations from the preferred
consumption basket exceeds the utility derived from additional leisure. Thus, fixed
TOT imply that domestic households are wealthier in the short run than in the
long run. As households adjust their behavior to the new steady state, the domestic
country runs a current account surplus.
If home and foreign goods are close substitutes, households exploit the improved
TOT in the long run. Prices are flexible and the labor-leisure trade off binds.
Expenditure switching in the long run implies a rising demand for foreign goods.
The fact that prices are flexible diminishes the TOT changes in the long run. This
mechanism leads to a goods market equilibrium in which the price of one unit of
foreign output on the world market equals the marginal utility gain from additional
leisure of domestic households. In such cases, fixed TOT in the short run imply
that the income of domestic households is lower than in the new steady state. The
overall result is that the home country runs a current account deficit.
We conclude that the response of relative consumption in the short run depends
quantitatively, but not qualitatively on the value of the cross-country substitutabil-
ity.
The domestic country runs a current account deficit if home and foreign goods are
close substitutes, and a surplus if home and foreign output are poor substitutes.
Magnitude and sign of the current account response are a function of the cross-
country substitutability. The threshold for a balanced current account is a function
of the probability to survive which governs the rate of time preference.
In the long run, domestic households always work more and consume less in or-
der to finance the increased tax burden which has to be paid exclusively by them.
Furthermore, they have to settle imbalances of the current account. We begin the
discussion of the long run effects with the solutions for relative consumption, output
and the TOT in the long run
c¯− c¯∗ = ψΦ + θ
θ(1 + ψΦ)
[
R0 − 1
1− n v¯ + [[nγcchb − 1] g¯H − [(1− n)γcchb − 1] g¯
∗
F ]
]
(1.41)
y¯ − y¯∗ = − ψΦ
ψΦ− 1
[(
R0 − 1
1− n
)
v¯ − (g¯H − g¯∗F )
]
(1.42)
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¯tot =
ψΦ
θ(1 + ψΦ)
[(
R0 − 1
1− n
)
v¯ + ([1− nγtotlr] g¯H − [1− (1− n)γtotlr] g¯∗F )
]
(1.43)
Because of the direct wealth effect, the response of relative consumption is negative
and that of relative output positive. By the reasoning above, both are also functions
of the cross-country substitutability and the short run current account response.
However, the direct wealth effect dominates all other effects and determines the
outcome of the model in the long run.
In the standard model with Ricardian consumers there is no strategic interaction of
fiscal policy if there is not at least some home bias in government spending. This
is no longer true if we assume failures of the Ricardian equivalence. Suppose a
permanent balanced-budget increase in domestic government spending under the
assumption that public demand aggregates in the same way as household demand
does.
The government levies taxes to finance the permanent increase in public spending.
The tax burden falls exclusively on domestic households and induces a permanent
negative direct wealth effect.
A permanent fiscal expansion translates in an increased demand for home and foreign
goods. In the short run, output is demand determined, thus world production
increases. Home and foreign households benefit from a positive indirect wealth
effect. Thus, domestic households are worse of than in the case of complete home
bias in government spending. While the increased tax burden falls exclusively on
them, they have to share the benefits with households abroad. The decrease in
domestic household income over all time horizons is more pronounced.
The consumption demand of domestic households is lower compared to the initial
steady state. Foreign household increase their demand for consumption goods and
leisure because their disposable income increases in the short run.
Public and private demand aggregate in the same way. Thus, there is no response
of relative output in the short run. The relative solutions for consumption, output
and the current account in the short run are given by
c− c∗ = γEU
γcc + γβω
(
d¯− d¯∗)− γcc
γcc(R0 − 1) + γβR0 [(R0 − 1) (g − g
∗) + (g¯ − g¯∗)] (1.44)
y − y∗ = 0 (1.45)
v¯ = −(1− n)
[
γEU
γcc + γβω
(d¯− d¯∗) + γβω
γcc + γβω
(g − g∗)− γcc
γcc(R0 − 1) + γβR0 (g¯ − g¯
∗)
]
(1.46)
Again, we vary the cross-country substitutability. Fig. 1.1 gives the marginal re-
sponse of short run relative consumption, the current account as well as the relative
consumption, output and the TOT in the long run.
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If government spending falls on domestic and foreign goods, a balanced-budget in-
crease withdraws resources from domestic households as to spend them on home
and foreign goods.
Domestic households share the benefits of this policy, i.e. increased wage and divi-
dend payments for foreign households. The responses of relative consumption and
the current account are of the same sign as under the assumption of complete home
bias but more pronounced.
This is true in the short as well as in the long run. We conclude the discussion of a
permanent balanced budget increase with the presentation of the relative solutions
for consumption, output and the terms off trade in the long run
c¯− c¯∗ = ψΦ + θ
θ (1 + ψΦ)
(
R0 − 1
1− n
)
v¯ − ψΦ + θ
θ (1 + ψΦ)
(g¯ − g¯∗) (1.47)
y¯ − y¯∗ = − ψΦ
1 + ψΦ
[(
R0 − 1
1− n
)
v¯ − (g¯ − g¯∗)
]
(1.48)
¯tot =
ψΦ
θ(1 + ψΦ)
[(
R0 − 1
1− n
)
v¯ − (g¯ − g¯∗)
]
(1.49)
We are mainly concerned about fiscal shocks that have no effects in a Ricardian
model, e.g. temporary deficit-financed fiscal policy measures.
As a reference point, we briefly discuss a temporary balanced budget increase in
domestic government spending. The domestic government decides to expand its
demand for goods for one period g0 = g¯ < g. The fiscal expansion is financed by an
equal temporary increase in taxation t0 = t¯ < t = g.
Again, we start with the assumption of complete home bias in public consumption.
Numerical examples are given in Fig. 1.2. There is a fundamental difference between
temporary and permanent balanced-budget changes in public spending. Permanent
changes in fiscal policy imply changes in household income in the long run. Namely,
in the form of permanent direct wealth effects. If the fiscal measure is temporary,
direct wealth effects are restricted to the short run.
Domestic consumption demand is a function of total income over the average life
expectancy. A temporary tax increase to finance public spending implies a reduction
of current income, while future total wealth is not directly affected.
We have shown that temporary fiscal measures do not alter the equilibrium world
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output and consumption level, see (1.37). However, the distribution of consumption
goods and labor effort between home and foreign households in the long run does
not return to the initial steady state values but depends on the distribution of global
wealth. Thus, the long run effect of a temporary change in fiscal policy depends on
its current account effect which makes the crucial difference between temporary and
permanent changes in government spending.
The increase in government spending induces certain asymmetries. The tax burden
falls exclusively on domestic households and the government spends exclusively on
home production. The cost and the benefits of the assumed policy measure occur
exclusively to domestic households.
Households recognize the temporary nature of the fiscal measure. Because of the
direct wealth effect, domestic income in the short run is below its long run level.
Households use the international capital market to smooth consumption. For the
assumed values of the cross-country substitutability, the domestic country runs a
current account deficit in the short run. This has to be settled by domestic house-
holds in the long run. They work more and consume less. The TOT adjust and the
labor-leisure trade-off binds.
The supply of domestic output on the world market increases compared to the initial
steady state. Thus, the TOT of the home country worsen.
The response of foreign consumption demand clearly mirrors this phenomenon.
There is a redistribution of world wealth in favor of foreign households in the long
run. This enables foreign households to consume more and work less compared to
the initial steady state. They benefit from improved TOT and their improved net
foreign asset position.
In the long run, the level of world output and consumption corresponds to the initial
steady state level. Because of the asymmetric distribution of world wealth, foreign
households consume a larger fraction of world output and enjoy more leisure than
in the initial equilibrium.
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All long run responses depend in magnitude, but not in sign on the cross-country
substitutability which determines the short run current account response.
To complete the discussion of balanced budget changes in domestic fiscal policy, we
discuss a temporary balanced budget increase in public spending under the assump-
tion that public demand aggregates in the same way as household demand. For a
numerical example, see Fig. 1.2. The important difference to the case of complete
home bias is again an asymmetric tax burden combined with symmetric indirect
wealth effects.
Domestic household income is reduced more than under the assumption of com-
plete home bias in public spending. Such a situation arises because the benefits of
the domestic fiscal expansion, increased wage and dividend payments will now have
to be shared with foreign households. As government demand falls on home and
foreign goods, there is no short run response of relative output. The transmission
mechanism is similar to the case of complete home bias. The only difference can
be found in the magnitude of the response. If the domestic government spends on
home as well as on foreign goods, the current account response and thus the long
run effects are amplified.
We conclude the analysis of balanced-budget changes in domestic government spend-
ing with a brief discussion of the effects on the level of domestic consumption and
output as well as the spillovers to the foreign country. For that we utilize the for-
mulas of Aoki (1981).
A balanced-budget increase in domestic public spending increases domestic pro-
duction in the short and long run, no matter if it is temporary or permanent and
independently of the composition of domestic public demand. The domestic house-
hold’s consumption of goods and leisure is decreased over all time horizons.
The effects on the levels of domestic variables are qualitatively independent of the
assumed duration and the composition of public spending. But in general, the ef-
fects on domestic output are more pronounced if we assume complete home bias.
36
Intuitively this is clear as in cases of complete home bias where the government
redistributes demand in favor of domestic producers and thus stimulates domestic
production. This implies that the benefits of this policy exclusively occur to domes-
tic households, whereby the decrease in consumption is relatively mild.
If we assume that government spending aggregates in the same way as private de-
mand, the effect on output is much smaller while domestic consumption is decreased
more severely. Again, this is intuitively evident as domestic households do not only
have to bear the complete cost of this policy in form of increased taxation but also
have to share the benefits with households abroad.
The spillover effects on output and consumption are much richer. In case of a
permanent balanced-budget increase in domestic spending under the assumption of
complete home bias, the spillover on output as well as on consumption for all time
horizons is negative. The domestic government takes away resources from domestic
consumers and spends these exclusively on domestic products. Thus, the demand
as well as the wage and dividend payments for foreign households decrease over all
time horizons. Output and consumption abroad are decreased.
If we assume that domestic spending aggregates in the same way as private demand,
a permanent balanced-budget increase in domestic public spending enables a higher
consumption abroad in the short as well as the long run. Foreign output is increased
in the short run. In the long run, foreign households are enabled to consume more
goods and leisure.
A temporary balanced-budget increase has similar short run effects. However, in
the long run foreign households will always benefit from the possibility of expanded
consumption and a reduced workload. Foreign output is always lower than domestic
production. The reason for this is that temporary balanced-budget changes do not
alter the world equilibrium output and consumption in the long run. The long run
effects of a temporary fiscal measure are determined by the current account effects
in the short run. As the domestic country runs a current account deficit in the short
37
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.35
-0.3
-0.25
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
short run relative consumption response
cross-country substitutability
%
t a
g
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
short run current account response
cross-country substitutability
%
t a
g
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
1 2 3 4 5 6
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
long run relative consumption response
cross-country substitutability
%
t a
g
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
1 2 3 4 5 6
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
long run relative output response
cross-country substitutability
%
t a
g
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
1 2 3 4 5 6
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
long run terms of trade response
cross-country substitutability
%
t a
g
e
 r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
 
no home bias
complete home bias
Figure 1.3: Deficit-spending of the domestic government, no home bias.
run for all cases to smooth consumption, a temporary balanced-budget increase in
domestic public spending always implies a redistribution of world wealth in favor of
foreign households.
We conclude that a balanced budget increase in domestic government spending
always has an expansionary effect on domestic output. Like in the basic repre-
sentative agent model, the response of domestic household consumption is always
negative. The spillovers depend on the precise assumptions to the composition of
public spending and the persistence of a fiscal shock.
1.3.2 Deficit spending of the domestic government
Suppose a temporary increase in government spending financed by debt. The do-
mestic government issues bonds d0 < d = d¯ to finance a temporary increase of public
spending on goods g0 = g¯ < g = d. Taxes remain fixed in the short run t = t0.
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In the long run the domestic government levies taxes t¯ = (R0 − 1)d¯ to finance the
interest payments on the accumulated stock of public liabilities.
A key characteristic of our model are failures of the Ricardian equivalence. In gen-
eral, Ricardian equivalence describes models in which there are no real effects of
the financing decision on aggregate demand. Thus, a temporary balanced-budget
increase in government spending and deficit spending are equivalent.
We start the comparison of a deficit-spending and a temporary balanced-budget in-
crease in government spending under the assumption of complete home bias in public
spending. By the numerical examples in Figs. 1.2, 1.3 we see that the responses of
the relative variables are qualitatively the same but quantitatively different.
Consider the consumption function of domestic households. Current consumption
is a function of current and future wealth. Future wealth enters the consumption
decision with a weight γ
R0−1 which depends on the average life expectancy. House-
holds base their consumption decision on the permanent income over the average
life expectancy.
A debt-financed fiscal expansion differs from a temporary balanced-budget increase
in domestic public spending by the intertemporal allocation of the cost and benefits
of this policy measure. Balanced-budget changes in public spending imply that the
costs and benefits of fiscal measures come into effect during the same period of time.
Deficit-spending has a temporary effect in the short run and a permanent effect in
the long run. The benefits of a positive indirect wealth effect occur in the short run
while the increase in taxation to finance this policy is deferred to the long run.
The permanent income over the average life expectancy is increased compared to
the case of a temporary balanced-budget change in public spending.
The transmission mechanism of the fiscal shock is unaffected by the financing deci-
sion. The intertemporal allocation of the financing decision alters the effect on the
domestic household’s consumption decision in the short run. This holds indepen-
dently of the composition of public spending.
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Domestic households reduce their consumption to a lesser account as compared to
the balanced budget case. To enable this, households borrow abroad which in turn
implies an increased current account deficit compared to the case of a temporary
balanced budget increase in domestic public spending.
The long run responses of relative output, consumption and the TOT, all depend
on the current account response. Thus, all responses are amplified. We conclude
that by manipulating the intertemporal allocation of disposable income, the fiscal
authorities have an additional policy instrument at hand. It allows the government
to mitigate the effects of fiscal expansion on current consumption. However, in case
of deficit spending it also implies that the tax burden to finance current government
spending falls entirely on the shoulders of future generations.
The effects on the level of domestic consumption are negative, but smaller than in
case of a temporary balanced-budget increase in domestic public spending. Domes-
tic output is increased in the short as well as in the long run.
Again, the sign of the spillover effects depends on the precise assumption we make
with regard to the composition of public spending. If the home government spends
exclusively on national goods, foreign consumption and output are decreased in the
short run. If domestic public spending aggregates in the same way as household
demand does, the foreign consumption and output are increased in the short run.
However, the domestic country always runs a current account deficit. Domestic
households borrow abroad to smooth consumption in the short run. The world dis-
tribution of wealth determines the long run responses at home and abroad. Thus,
foreign households are enabled to consume more and work less in the long run.
We conclude that deficit-spending always stimulates domestic production and trig-
gers a decline in domestic consumption of goods and leisure over all time horizons.
Foreign households benefit from a redistribution of world wealth to their favor in
the long run.
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Figure 1.4: A debt-financed tax cut by the domestic government.
1.3.3 A debt financed tax cut in the domestic country
We conclude the evaluation of fiscal policy measures with a debt-financed tax cut
in the domestic country. The home government issues bonds d0 < d = d¯ to finance
a temporary tax cut t¯ > t0 > t. In the long run, taxes are levied to finance the
interest payments on the accumulated stock of public liabilities t¯ = (R0 − 1)d¯.
In a model featuring Ricardian agents, debt and taxation are equivalent financing
decisions. Thus, Ricardian consumers do not respond to this policy measure at all.
The key to the real effects of this policy is the finite horizon. Households in the Blan-
chard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG maximize utility over their average life expectancy.
Individuals are aware that part of the stream of future taxation which is levied to
finance the interest payments on debt issued in the short run falls in the periods of
time after their death. They expect to repay only a fraction of the public liabilities,
depending on their probability to survive γ < 1. Thus, part of the issued govern-
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ment debt is perceived as net wealth. In the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG
a debt-financed tax cut is an intertemporal redistribution of real income in favor of
the current generation.
The resources obtained by the government by issuing debt in the short run are com-
pletely redistributed to households. Public spending is fixed at the initial steady
state level.
We illustrate this policy experiment with a numerical example in Fig. 1.4. Domestic
households benefit from the direct wealth effect of a tax cut in the short run. In the
long run, the direct wealth effect is reversed as taxes are levied to cover the interest
payment on public debt. If γ is sufficiently small, the positive direct wealth effect
in the short run prevails.
As a result, domestic households increase their demand for consumption goods. Out-
put at home and abroad are increased compared to the initial steady state. This
is explained by the fact that short run movements in output are determined by de-
mand and not by the supply-side labor-leisure decisions. An increase in domestic
consumption drives demand for world production up. However, as only part of gov-
ernment debt is perceived as net wealth, the effects on output and consumption are
positive but small.
Households at home and abroad benefit from an indirect wealth effect. Labor and
dividend income are increased in the home country and abroad. As private con-
sumption demand falls on home and foreign goods there is no response of relative
output in the short run.
Given this result, a change in relative consumption implies that domestic households
consume a larger fraction of world production than in the initial steady state. To
enable the households to do so, they have to borrow abroad.
Again, the magnitude of the relative consumption response as well the current ac-
count response depend on the assumed cross-country elasticity. If domestic house-
holds borrow abroad they have to settle the current account deficit in the future.
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Thus, in the long run, domestic production has to be in excess to foreign output.
The latter will only occur if the relative weights on home and foreign goods in the
domestic and foreign consumption basket are different from the initial steady state.
Or in other words, if home and foreign goods are poor substitutes there is only
little scope for international lending. Foreign households do not gain from short run
lending because the reimbursements do not increase their utility in the future. A
low cross-country elasticity nearly shuts down the current account channel.
We conclude that the cross-country substitutability determines the international
distribution of gains deriving from of a debt-financed tax cut. If home and for-
eign goods are poor substitutes, the benefits of a debt-financed tax cut are shared
between home and foreign households in the short run. The response of relative
consumption and the current account effects are only small.
In the long run, the model response is driven by the current account effect. A
debt-financed tax cut alway worsens the domestic country’s net foreign asset posi-
tion. In addition, the long run tax burden has exclusively be carried by domestic
households. Hence, the response of relative consumption in the long run is always
negative. Domestic households have to work more to finance tax payments to the
home government and interest payments to households abroad. The response of
relative output in the long run is positive, whereas the TOT worsen.
The spillovers on foreign consumption are positive in the short as well as the long
run. The levels of domestic and foreign output as well as consumption are always
increased in the short run. In the long run, households abroad profit from a redis-
tribution of world wealth in their favor.
We conclude that failures of the Ricardian equivalence allow for fiscal measures
that increase short run consumption as well as output in the world economy by the
intertemporal redistribution of income.
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Figure 1.5: Welfare. A permanent balanced budget increase in public spending.
1.4 Normative analysis
The Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG poses a problem for normative policy anal-
ysis. Namely, the choice of an adequate welfare criterion. Blanchard and Fischer
(1989) argue that an appropriate welfare criterion must be as such so that house-
holds agree to it, independently of the period of their birth. They suggest a weighted
average of the welfare of current and future generations
(U − U∗)total = λ (U − U∗)current + (1− λ) (U − U∗)future (1.50)
where 0 < λ < 1, (U − U∗)current = (c − c∗) − φ−1φ (y − y∗) +
γβ
1−γβ
[
(c¯− c¯∗)− φ−1
φ
(y¯ − y¯∗)
]
and (U − U∗)future = 11−γβ
[
(c¯− c¯∗)− φ−1
φ
(y¯ − y¯∗)
]
.
The welfare criterion is derived by log-linearizing the utility function in per-capita
terms. We measure utility in relative terms3, where λ assigns weights to the utility
of current and future generations. We abstract from utility that is derived from real
balances.
3We follow Ganelli (2005) and measure utility in the two-country Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965)
OLG in relative terms.
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Figure 1.6: Welfare. A temporary balanced budget increase in public spending.
To illustrate the welfare effects of the various fiscal measures, we provide numerical
examples4. Fig. 1.5 displays the welfare effects of a balanced budget increase
in domestic public spending by one percent of the domestic output in the initial
steady state. A permanent balanced budget rise in government spending decreases
the real income of households over all time horizons. Domestic current and future
generations suffer from a decrease in relative utility.
Nevertheless, the welfare effect on current and future generations is not identical.
The current generation has to pay the higher tax rate and borrows abroad to
smooth the transition in the path of consumption and leisure. Future generations
have to carry the burden of increased taxation and to settle the current account
imbalance which they have inherited from the current generation. Thus, the future
4The numerical examples given in figures 1.5-1.8 are based on the following parametrization:
β = 0.99, ψ = 1, χ = 0.1, φ = 6, γ = 0.7 and n = 0.5. We vary the cross-country substitutability
θ ∈ [0.1, 6] and calculate total welfare for different values of λ, λ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9.
45
1 2 3 4 5 6
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
relative utility, current generation
1 2 3 4 5 6
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
relative utility, future generation
1 2 3 4 5 6
-3.5
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
total relative utility, lambda=0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
total relative utility, lambda=0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
total relative utility, lambda=0.9
 
 
no home bias
complete home bias
Figure 1.7: Welfare. Deficit spending.
generations suffer a welfare loss that is more severe than the loss of the current
generation.
However, the difference in the welfare loss of current and future generations is small.
The reason is that the change in taxation determines the welfare impact. Thus,
the effect of changes in the weights on welfare of current and future generations on
total welfare is small. The same is true for changes in the probability to survive.
A change in the probability to survive affects the optimizing behavior of individual
households. Again, as the tax increase dominates the welfare effect, changes in γ
do not affect total welfare substantially.
The substitutability between home and foreign goods determines the expenditure
switching effects and the scope for international lending. Thus, changes in the
cross-country substitutability have considerable welfare effects.
An illustration of the welfare effects of a temporary balanced budget increase in
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Figure 1.8: Welfare. A debt-financed tax cut.
government consumption is given in Fig. 1.6. In general, the welfare loss of current
and future generations is lower than in the permanent case.
The reason is found in the temporary nature of the assumed policy. There are
notable differences in the effects of a temporary balanced budget change in public
consumption on current and future generations. The current generation has to
finance the increase in government spending by an increased tax rate. To smooth
the decrease in real income the current generation borrows abroad. In turn, this
redistribution of world wealth determines the long run effects. Future generations
have to settle the implied imbalance in world wealth but do not suffer from increased
tax rates.
The effects of changes in the probability to survive and the cross-country substi-
tutability are similar to the case of a permanent change in public spending. But
now changes in the relative weight of the current and future generations have
47
considerable effects on total welfare. This is explained by circumstance that the
long run effect of such a policy depends on its current account effects. The current
generation internalizes the welfare loss of future generations for low values of λ.
We depict the welfare effects of deficit spending in Fig. 1.7. Deficit spending
differs from a temporary balanced budget increase in government spending by the
financing decision of the government. The temporary increase in public demand is
financed by issuing public debt. Future generations have to finance the debt service
by a permanent increase in taxation.
However, given our simple timing assumptions and the underlying assumption that
the government only pays the interest rate on the accumulated debt stock, the
welfare effects are similar to the case of a temporary balanced budget increase in
public consumption. We want to emphasize that this is an outflow of the applied
timing assumptions. This statement is not true if we allow the government to shift
changes in taxation to finance the debt services further into the future.
The assumption to the composition of government spending does not alter the
qualitative welfare effects of the fiscal measures discussed above. In general, the
assumption of complete home bias decreases the welfare losses which are implied
by an increase in government spending. This is because all benefits of the fiscal
expansion, i.e. an increased demand for consumption goods occurs to domestic
producers. Assuming complete home bias in the standard model potentially under-
estimates welfare losses that are implied by an increase in government spending, no
matter how it is financed.
Fig. 1.8 illustrates the welfare impact of a debt financed tax cut. This fiscal
measure differs from the above mentioned in two dimensions. Firstly, it implies
an intertemporal reallocation of real income in favor of the current generation and
secondly, does not involve changes in the level of public consumption.
The current generation profits from this phenomenon in terms of an increase in
real income. It enables an increased consumption of the current generation which
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implies welfare gains. In the long run, future generations have to cover the cost of
such a policy measure by higher taxation in order to cover the interest payments
on the accumulated stock of government debt.
Thus, a debt-financed tax cut increases the welfare of the current generation and
implies welfare losses for future generations. As a consequence, the probability to
survive and the weight on the welfare of the current and future generations are
important elements to determine the total welfare effects of such a fiscal measure.
If γ is close to one, households expect to survive long enough to repay a rela-
tively large fraction of the issued debt. Thus, the utility of the current generation
decreases. Small values of λ imply that the current generation cares for their
descendants. Total welfare decreases with the weight on the utility of the current
generation and increasing life expectancy which mirrors the famous result of Barro
(1974).
Changes in the cross-country substitutability affect the welfare of households in the
same way as discussed above.
We conclude that in the two-country Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG, fiscal
measures have the potential to increase short run output and private consumption
demand at the same time. Moreover, a fiscal stimulus does not necessarily diminish
total household welfare in the implementing country. It is evident that the positive
as well as the normative effects of fiscal policy depend on the precise type of the
assumed policy measure.
1.5 Conclusions
We present a two-country model of a currency union featuring failures of the Ri-
cardian equivalence. The model allows us to study the transmission and welfare
effects of fiscal measures in a monetary union apart from balanced budget policies.
Furthermore, we explore the role of the cross-country substitutability and look at
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the composition of public spending in view of the transmission of fiscal shocks.
The underlying model is complex. Our simplifying assumptions of one period price
stickiness and abstracting from the use of capital in production allow us to solve it
in relative terms. The solution yields some intuitive insights into the mechanisms
that are underlying the transmission of fiscal policy in a currency union.
Firstly, a permanent balanced budget increase in domestic public spending decreases
consumption but stimulates output in the home country. The real income loss due
to increased taxation determines the overall effects of this policy measure. This
implies welfare losses for the domestic households in the short as well as the long
run.
The spillover effects on the foreign country depend on the precise assumptions re-
garding the composition of public spending. Under complete home bias in domestic
public spending, real income abroad is decreased over all time horizons. The spillover
effects are unambiguously negative and lead to welfare losses abroad.
However, if we assume that public spending aggregates in the same way as house-
hold consumption does then the spillover switches sign. In that case, a permanent
balanced budget increase in domestic government spending rises real income and
welfare abroad.
Secondly, in case of temporary balanced budget increases in the domestic country
have similar effects on the levels of variables. However, the transmission mechanism
is very different. While in the case of permanent changes, the tax effects determine
the short as well as the long run model response, which is not true for cases of
temporary fiscal measures.
Moreover, we have shown that world output and consumption return to their steady
state level in the long run, given that a fiscal measure does not alter the permanent
level of public spending. The long run effects of temporary fiscal measures depend
on how they affect the distribution of world wealth. Thus, a temporary balanced
budget increase in government spending does not affect the level of world output
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and consumption in the long run, but it has an impact on the distribution of the
world workload and globally available consumption goods.
The magnitude of changes in the distribution of world wealth and expenditure
switching effects in the long run, in turn, depend on the cross-country substitutabil-
ity which determines the scope for international lending and borrowing.
Thirdly, deficit spending is not equivalent to a temporary balanced budget increase
in public spending. However, under our simple timing assumptions the transmission
and welfare effects are identical as in case of a temporary balanced budget increase
in domestic public spending but quantitatively smaller.
This is because although deficit spending implies an intertemporal dispersion of the
cost and benefits of public spending this is just a shift by one period in our setting.
Technically, deficit spending is a combination of a long run change in taxation and
a temporary change in government spending which is not equivalent to a temporary
balanced budget change in government spending.
Fourthly, a debt financed tax cut has no effects in Ricardian models. In our model,
it affects the consumption decision of private households and domestic output. The
reason for this is a redistribution of real income from the future to the current
generations. Domestic households increase their demand for consumption goods.
Production home and abroad increases in the short run. Depending on the assump-
tions we make on the expected lifetime of domestic households and their selfishness,
a debt-financed tax cut can be welfare improving.
The spillovers are positive, foreign households benefit from an increased real income
over all time horizons and thus lead to improved welfare.
Overall, our results are close to the empirical findings of Mountford and Uhlig (2005)
as far as the domestic consumption and output response to fiscal measures are con-
cerned. Under the assumption of no home bias in public spending, our results are
close to empirical evidence provided by Beetsma et al. (2006) on spillovers of fiscal
policy measures in Europe.
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We conclude that the precise type and the financing decision matters for the trans-
mission and spillover effects of fiscal policy in a monetary union. The predictions of
Ricardian models can be misleading as this modelling choice restricts fiscal policy
to balanced budget measures.
The European Economic Recovery Plan as well as the OECD (2009) rely on increases
in public consumption, tax cuts targeted to households and public investment to
stimulate the economy during the recent economic downturn. As we do not model
investment, we focus on the national effects and spillovers of the first two measures,
only. Moreover, we restrict our attention to the short run effects of fiscal policy.
In our model, a temporary debt-financed increase in public spending stimulates out-
put and at the same time decreases consumption in the home country. The spillovers
depend on the precise assumptions to the composition of public demand. If the gov-
ernment spends exclusively on national goods, the spillovers on foreign output and
consumption are negative. However, although the spillovers on foreign consumption
are still negative the assumption that the home government spends on home and
foreign goods changes the sign of the spillover on foreign production. The latter is
in accordance with the empirical evidence provided by Beetsma and Jensen (2005).
Finally, we can state that the welfare effects of debt-financed increases are always
negative and this in both countries.
A debt-financed tax cut stimulates domestic output and consumption and has pos-
itive spillover effects on both variables abroad. Moreover, in our model the before
mentioned measure is the only policy capable of stimulating private consumption.
The welfare effect of a debt-financed tax cut depends on the survival probability of
households and how much they care for future generations. The result can be either
positive or negative.
In the long run, both policies lead to increased taxation and welfare losses for future
generations. We conclude that from our simple model’s point of view the choice of
policy measures employed to stimulate the economy depends on the macroeconomic
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variable the government wants to target. If the government intends to stimulate
private consumption, tax cuts are the only instrument at hand. Moreover, from a
welfare perspective a debt-financed tax cut can be implemented in such a way so
that it does not decrease the welfare of current generations.
However, one has to bear in mind that some of our results are driven by our simpli-
fying assumptions. Therefore, we discuss some extensions and their potential effects
on the results. Because of the solution technique we cannot evaluate fiscal measures
such as deficit spending or tax cuts that are financed by decreases in government
spending in the future. Such intertemporal balanced budget operations potentially
improve welfare of the current as well as the future generation.
As we abstract from capital holdings, we cannot explore the effects of fiscal measures
on private investment. Hence, an extension of the model to allow for capital and
richer timing assumptions is the natural next step.
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Chapter 2
A Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965)
OLG model for fiscal policy
evaluation
2.1 Introduction
How does fiscal policy affect private activity over the business cycle? More precisely,
which fiscal instruments, if any, are appropriate to conduct stabilization policies?
The recent economic downturn accompanied by massive and mostly debt-financed
stimulus packages have forcefully increased public awareness in these questions. The
European Commission (2008) suggests discretionary increases in public spending
and investment combined with decreases in household taxation to halt the economic
downturn.
The OECD (2009) which surveyed the discretionary fiscal measures taken in the
wake of the recent economic downturn found that debt-financed expansions of gov-
ernment consumption, public investment in infrastructure and tax reliefs targeted
at private households where implemented in virtually all member countries.
According to the OECD (2009), government consumption is expected to be the most
effective discretionary measure in terms of output stabilization. When it comes to
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policy advice, the OECD identifies fiscal measures which are expected to boost ag-
gregate demand in the short run and strengthen aggregate supply in the long run at
the same time. The OECD (2009) claims that public investment as well as decreases
in household taxation yield such double-dividends.
Cwik and Wieland (2010) and Cogan et al. (2010) try to assess the impact of the
stimulus packages released both in Europe and the US in 2009 by using quantitative
macroeconomic models. They focus on the standard experiment in macroeconomic
literature, i.e. an exogenous increase in public consumption which is financed by
future taxation.
Cwik and Wieland (2010) and Cogan et al. (2010) ask whether public consump-
tion is indeed capable of stimulating output by more than one-to-one, i.e. if there
are Keynesian multiplier effects of public consumption. They find that increases in
public consumption crowd out private consumption and investment which in turn
mitigates positive effects on output. Thus, they find no support for the use of public
consumption as an effective instrument to boost aggregate demand, that is there is
no Keynesian multiplier effect of public consumption.
Although public consumption is expected to be the most powerful fiscal tool to sta-
bilize aggregate demand in the short run, the assumed policies of Cwik and Wieland
(2010) and Cogan et al. (2010) are, for various reasons, no realistic description of
fiscal measures that are implemented in response to the recent economic downturn.
Firstly, their results are based on the assumption that increases in public spending
are financed by taxation.
Empirical evidence, e.g. the findings of Alesina and Perotti (1996) and von Hagen
et al. (2001) do not support short run fluctuations in taxation. They find that
in developed countries successful consolidations have predominantly been based on
spending cuts. This view is confirmed by Corsetti et al. (2009) who also find that
increases in public spending are financed by increased taxation and spending cuts in
the medium and long run. In particular, the results of Corsetti et al. (2009) suggest
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that the financing decision of the government has a strong impact on the behavior
of households.
Secondly, the stimulus packages released in OECD member countries were rarely
focused on government consumption. In fact, according to the OECD (2009), in
the majority of member countries tax cuts where preferred over increasing public
spending. Thus, restricting the attention to public consumption is likely to exclude
important dimensions of the implemented policies to fight the recent economic down-
turn.
Moreover, a focus on standard models is questionable when it comes to the eval-
uation of fiscal measures. Consider an increase in government spending on goods
in either the classical RBC model, e.g. Baxter and King (1993), or the standard
new Keynesian model, e.g. Gali (2008) and you will find that increased government
spending withdraws resources from the private sector. To offset the negative wealth
effects, households increase their labor supply and demand less consumption goods
which then leads to a decrease in real wages and an increase in output. These predic-
tions of widely used standard models contradict a large body of empirical evidence.
The issue of how fiscal policy affects key macroeconomic variables such as consump-
tion and output is an active field of empirical research. Since the seminal contribu-
tions of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford
and Uhlig (2009), numerous empirical studies estimated the effects of fiscal policy
shocks. The empirical work on fiscal policy is based on structural vector autore-
gressive (SVAR) methods. Fiscal policy is characterized by time lags in the decision
process and sluggish implementation.
In view of the wide variety of fiscal instruments and possible financing schemes, the
identification of exogenous fiscal policy shocks is the central issue in this literature.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) assume that because of the time-consuming process
of fiscal decision making there is no discretionary interaction between fiscal pol-
icy and contemporaneous macroeconomic developments in high frequency data. In
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quarterly data, the only contemporaneous interaction is due to automatic stabiliz-
ers. They model these interactions by institutional information, i.e. Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) estimate the elasticities of automatic fiscal responses with respect to
the macroeconomic variables included in their SVAR.
The SVAR approach suggested by Mountford and Uhlig (2009) does fully rely on the
identification of fiscal policy shocks from the data. More precisely, they identify a
fiscal shock from a two dimensional vector space which is spanned by a spending and
a revenue shock by sign restrictions, e.g. a positive spending shock and a revenue
shock of the same sign constitute a balanced-budget expansion of public spending.
In doing so, Mountford and Uhlig (2009) implicitly rely on economic theory, i.e. an
underlying model that delivers the imposed restrictions. Thus, their approach is
an excellent test to compare the performance of competing theories. At the same
instance, this is the major criticism of the method as there is no generally agreed
theoretical model for fiscal policy transmission.
Another strand of research relies on the narrative approach suggested by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998) who identify fiscal policy shocks in US data. They study contempo-
rary newspapers in view of identifying several military build-ups as exogenous fiscal
shocks. These are labeled as Ramey-Shapiro episodes in the subsequent literature.
There is a vast number of empirical studies that assess the effects of fiscal policy
following the above mentioned three approaches. Surveys of the empirical literature
can be found in Gali et al. (2007) and von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008). The empirical
evidence suggests that the response of consumption and output to fiscal expansions
depends on the financing decisions of the government.
Moreover, empirical estimates of the effects of fiscal spending expansions suggest
that output and consumption increase in response to an increase in public con-
sumption. They suggest an increase in employment and the results for the response
of the real wage rate are inconclusive. In particular, there is no empirical evidence
for the pronounced decrease in real wage rates as predicted by standard models.
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The definition of public consumption in empirical literature is not homogeneous. In
general, studies which are applying the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) define government spending as the sum of public con-
sumption and investment. Studies that utilize the approach of Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) are necessarily based on increases in public defense spending.
From these definitions only the latter corresponds to the assumption of purely dis-
sipative government spending in standard models. The fact that the empirical ev-
idence is difficult to reconcile with standard theoretical models is widely accepted.
A number of researchers suggests theoretical models to overcome this contradiction.
Cogan et al. (2010) address this issue by extending their quantitative model by so-
called rule-of-consumers who have no access to financial markets. In doing so, they
follow Gali et al. (2007). However, to obtain qualitative changes in the response of
consumption to increases in public spending, Cogan et al. (2010) need to assume a
very large share of credit-constraint consumers. In fact, the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers estimated by Cogan et al. (2010) using US data does not change their
results substantially.
We suggest a new Keynesian model that features finite lifespans modeled as an
overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type. The
model features nominal and real rigidities as well as private and public investment.
The characteristic distortion of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG model is the
introduction of uncertain lifetimes by a single parameter γ, the survival probability
of households. If γ < 1 the model features failures of the Ricardian equivalence. A
value of γ < 1 adds a wealth channel to the model that enables fiscal policy to affect
household consumption by the intertemporal redistribution of income. In particular,
if fiscal policy measures are financed by taxation, depending on the precise value of
γ only a fraction of the tax burden falls on current generations.
We extend the analysis of fiscal shocks in two dimensions. Firstly, we allow for a
wider array of fiscal instruments to stimulate the economy, both, on the spending-
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and revenue side of the public budget. We allow for public consumption, tax cuts
targeted directly to households and public investment in infrastructure.
Secondly, we assume a positive and constant level of public spending which is fi-
nanced by distortionary taxation in the model equilibrium. Thus, the government
is also able to decide on how to finance temporary fiscal measures. It may either
decide to choose spending-side measures, i.e. cuts in public consumption, or decide
to improve public revenues by increasing taxation.
Thus, our model allows for the evaluation of fiscal measures that are typically used
in practice to halt and even reverse a recession. We ask whether we can confirm the
effectiveness of such policies in a theoretical model.
We find that a temporary increase in public consumption always stimulates aggre-
gate demand, increases hours worked and leads to a drop in the real wage rate.
However, its effects on household consumption and private investment depend on
the assumed financing strategy as well as failures of the Ricardian equivalence. If
the increase in public consumption is financed by taxation, private investment is
always crowded out. Consumption is decreased, if the Ricardian equivalence holds
and is stimulated otherwise.
Financing of a temporary increase in public consumption by future spending cuts
stimulates household consumption, no matter whether the Ricardian equivalence
holds or not.
However, failures of the Ricardian equivalence affect the response of private invest-
ment which is increased in the standard model and crowded out otherwise.
Lump-sum subsidies that are financed by future taxation have no effect in a Ricar-
dian model. Failures of the Ricardian equivalence allow this fiscal policy pattern to
increase output and household consumption. Private investment as well as the real
wage rate are decreased and we observe an increase in hours worked.
In cases where a lump-sum transfer to households is financed by future spending
cuts output as well as private consumption and investment in a Ricardian model are
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stimulated. However, failures of the Ricardian equivalence affect the impact of this
fiscal choice on private investment, whereby the sign is reversed.
Finally, public investment has similar effects as a positive productivity shock in
standard models. Output, consumption, private investment and hours worked are
always increased while the real wage rate declines. These effects are only altered
qualitatively when we assume that public investment is financed by spending cuts
or when we allow for failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
In summary we find that the choice of the fiscal instrument as well as the financing
decision have an impact on the effects of fiscal policy on key macroeconomic vari-
ables. The effect of the financing decision is at least as important as non-Ricardian
behavior.
We conclude from that the policy advice of the OECD, which emphasizes the impor-
tance of the fiscal exit strategy is confirmed by our results. Moreover, the preferred
choice of the majority of OECD countries not to focus their fiscal stimulus packages
solely on public consumption, seems a reasonable choice from our model’s point of
view.
Finally, our results suggest that in order to estimate the effects of fiscal measures, it
is crucial to identify the precise type of fiscal shock as well as the financing decision
from the data.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 sets out the closed economy Blan-
chard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG. In section 2.3, we analyze the positive aspects of
fiscal policy measures which were implemented by a typical OECD member coun-
try in response to the recent economic turmoil. Finally, section 2.4 presents the
conclusions and possible extensions of the model.
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2.2 The Model
We suggest a discrete-time new Keynesian closed-economy model featuring capital
accumulation as well as nominal and real frictions in goods and labor markets. We
follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume staggered wage and price setting of the Calvo
(1983) type.
Households are introduced in the form of overlapping generations following the
discrete-time version of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG by Frenkel et al.
(1996). Individuals face a symmetric constant probability of death 0 < 1 − γ < 1,
share the same preferences and have no bequest motive. For analytical convenience,
we assume that birth and death rates are equal. The total population is normalized
to one.
A new cohort of (1 − γ) ∈ [0, 1] of households is born in each period. The size of
a generation born at time a in period s ≥ a is (1 − γ)γa−s, the expected lifetime
of an individual household is 1
1−γ . Failures of the Ricardian equivalence
1 are a well
known property of this model setup. Households perceive issued government debt
as net wealth if γ < 1. If the survival probability tends to unity households expect
to live forever and the non-Ricardian features of the model vanish.
Following Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965), we assume the existence of a perfectly
competitive life insurance market that solves the problem of unintended bequests.
Insurance companies receive the financial wealth of deceased households and dis-
tribute it to the surviving members of the society.
1We refer to Ricardian equivalence to describe theories or/and models in which there are no
real effects of the financing decision of a given amount of government spending on aggregate
demand.
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2.2.1 Households
A individual household h ∈ [0, 1] born in period a maximizes his utility over con-
sumption C and leisure (1−L) according to the certainty equivalent utility function
EtUt(h) =
∞∑
s=t
(γβ)
s−t
[
lnCa+s−t,s(h) +
χ0
1− χ (1− La+s−t,s(h))
1−χ
]
where β, χ0, χ > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1]. Preferences are homothetic and additively
separable over consumption and leisure. The household’s endowment of time in
each period is normalized to one, therefore (1− L) , L ∈ [0, 1] denotes leisure. The
nominal individual flow budget constraint of a household of age a reads
γDa,t(h)
1 + it
− (1 + τ ct )PtCa,t(h) ≤ Da−1,t−1(h)+
(1− τwt )Wa,t(h)La,t(h) + PtTa,t(h) + (1− τkt )
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)di+ Π
k
t
where D denotes the individual holdings of government debt, τ c, τ k, τw are distor-
tionary tax rates on consumption, capital and labor, T is a lump-sum transfer and
it the nominal interest rate paid on bond holdings between t and t + 1. Individual
households receive equal shares of profits of intermediate goods producers
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)di
and capital rental firms Πkt independently of age.
The assumption that productivity and consumption preferences are independently
of age allows us to calculate per-capita variables by aggregating across ages and then
dividing them by population size. Individual and per-capita variables coincide in
the model. Variables without age a index denote per-capita values. The households
optimizing behavior yields the per-capita consumption function
PtCt(h) =
1− γβ
1 + τ ct
[Ht(h) + Ωa,t(h) +Da−1,t−1(h)] (2.1)
where 1−γβ
1+τct
is the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth
Ωt =
∞∑
s=t
ψt,sγ
s−t(1− τks )
[∫ 1
0
Πs(i)di+ Π
k
s
]
the household financial wealth and
Ht =
∞∑
s−t
ψt,sγ
s−t [(1− τw)WtLt + PtTt]
the human wealth in per-capita terms. The present value factor is defined as
ψt,s =
 ψt,s = 1 if s = tψt,s = 1(1+it)·...·(1+it+s) if s > t
The optimizing behavior of households implies the Euler equation for the optimal
intertemporal allocation of consumption
(1 + τ ct )Pt+1Ct+1 +
1− γ
γ
1− γβ
1 + τ c
Dt = (1 + it)β(1 + τ
c
t )PtCt (2.2)
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We assume that each individual household h, independently of age, faces a
downward-sloping demand curve for his individual skill
Lt(h) =
(
Wt(h)
Wt
)−φ
Lt
where φ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor inputs
in production, Lt,Wt are the aggregate labor demand and wage rate and Wt(h) is
the per-capita wage rate. Individual workers have monopolistic power on the labor
market as they supply a unique skill.
We follow Calvo (1983) and assume that in any period, a fraction of workers can
reset their wages with probability 0 < (1 − ξw) < 1. If a worker is not allowed to
reset his wage rate, it is updated according to the rule
Wt+j = pi
jWa,t(h)
where pi is the inflation target of the monetary authority. The optimal wage choice of
an individual household that resets his individual wage rate in period t in per-capita
terms reads
wt(h) =
(
χ0
φ
1− φ
)
Et
∑∞
s=t (γβξw)
s−t
(1− Ls(h))−χ (1 + τ cs )Cs(h)
Et
∑∞
s=t (γβξw)
s−t
(1 + τks )ws
Et
∞∑
s=t
(γβξw)
s−t
s−t∏
k=1
∆wt+k(2.3)
where wt =
Wt
Pt
, ∆w−1t =
piWt−1
Wt
and wt(h) =
Wt(h)
Wt
and the law of motion for the
aggregate wage level reads
Wt = ξwpiWt−1 + (1− ξw)Wt(h)
2.2.2 Production sector
The production sector provides a homogeneous final good Yt which can be either used
for investment or consumption and consists of three sectors: capital rental firms,
intermediate goods producers and a representative final goods producer. Capital
rental firms demand the final goods and transform them into production capital
that is used in the production of intermediate goods.
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers. They demand capital and
labor as productive inputs and combine them into differentiated intermediate goods
which are supplied to a representative final goods producer. In the final production
stage intermediate goods are transformed costlessly into the homogeneous final good.
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The capital rental firm
A representative capital rental firm transforms the homogeneous consumption good
into a capital good K which is used by intermediate goods producers as a productive
input. We assume that each household holds an identical share of the representative
capital rental firm. The capital rental firm maximizes the discounted value of its
real profits
Πkt
Pt
=
∞∑
s=0
(
1
1 + rt
)s [
(1− τk)rk,t+sKt+s − It+s − κk
2
Kt+s
(
It+s
Kt+s
− δ
)2]
where rk,t is the real rental cost for capital, It real investment and Kt the capital
stock. We assume quadratic capital adjustment cost which is a standard approach,
common in the literature; see Adda and Cooper (2003) for a throughout discussion
of the functional form and the related empirical literature. The parameter κk > 0
scales the capital adjustment costs, when used in production capital depreciates at
rate δ > 0. The law of motion for the capital stock is given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (2.4)
The first order conditions for capital and investment are given by
qt = 1 + κk
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(2.5)
qt =
Pt+1
Pt
1 + it
[
(1− τkt+1)rk,t+1 + qt+1(1− δ)−
κk
2
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)2
+ κk
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)
It+1
Kt+1
]
(2.6)
where qt is the Lagrangian multiplier of the firm’s optimization problem which can
be interpreted as Tobin’s q.
Intermediate goods producer
A continuum of intermediate goods producers i ∈ [0, 1] combines capital and labor
into a variety yt(i) of the intermediate good. In doing so, intermediate producers
operate in three different markets: the market for intermediate goods, the labor
market and the market for physical capital. Intermediate producers have no market
power at labor and capital markets on which they act as price takers.
Intermediate producers supply a unique variety of the intermediate good. They have
some monopolistic power in setting the price for their production. Intermediate
producers maximize their profits given a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
production technology
yt(i) = Kt(i)
αLt(i)
1−α−θpKθpp,t (2.7)
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where 0 < α + θp < 1. We allow for government investment in infrastructure Kp,t.
The optimal combination of capital and labor for a given stock of public capital is
obtained from cost minimization by intermediate producers
mct =
rk,t
α yt(i)Kt(i)
(2.8)
mct =
wt
(1− α− θp) yt(i)Lt(i)
(2.9)
where wt is the real aggregate wage rate and mct the real marginal cost which is
symmetric across intermediate firms.
We assume staggered price setting on the intermediate goods market following Calvo
(1983). An intermediate producer i can renew its price in any period of time with
probability 1− ξp. The probability that an intermediate producer i cannot reset its
price in any period between t and t + j is ξjp. If an intermediate producer cannot
update its pricing calculations, prices adjust according to the rule
Pt+j(i) = pi
sPt
The optimal pricing decision in period t is given by
Pt(i) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0 ψt,jξ
s
p
(∏j
k=1 it+kmct+jYt+j
)
Et
∑∞
j=0 ψt,jξ
s
pYt+j
(2.10)
and the law of motion for the aggregate price level reads
Pt = ξppiPt−1 + (1− ξp)Pt(i)
The final good producer
A representative final goods producer transforms intermediate goods into a homo-
geneous final consumption good
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
using a CES technology. The final goods producer chooses its inputs i ∈ [0, 1]
to maximize profits. The implied demand schedule facing the intermediate goods
producer of variety i is given by
yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
Under the assumption of perfect competition on the final goods market, the final
goods producer sets its price to ensure zero profits. Thus, the final goods pricing
rule is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
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2.2.3 The monetary and fiscal authorities
We focus on the effects of fiscal policy shocks. To facilitate the analysis monetary and
fiscal policy are assumed to follow simple feedback rules. The monetary authority
sets its instrument, the nominal interest rate it, according to the Taylor rule
it =
1
β
− 1 + φpi(pit − pi) (2.11)
where pi = 0 is the inflation target and φpi > 1 the Taylor coefficient on inflation
stabilization. The central bank chooses a value for its policy parameter φpi. For
a given monetary policy the fiscal authorities decide on the level of taxation and
public spending
Gt = Gc,t + Ip,t (2.12)
where Gc,t is the level of purely dissipative government consumption of goods and
Ip,t the level of public investment in infrastructure. Following the literature, public
capital enters the production function of the intermediate goods sector. The law of
motion for public capital Kp,t is given by
Kp,t+1 = (1− δ)Kp,t + Ip,t (2.13)
where the capital depreciation rate is the same as in the private sector. For an
extensive discussion of the modeling decision, see Romp and de Haan (2007).
Government revenues stem from distortionary taxes on consumption τ ct , wages τ
w
t ,
capital income τ kt , the level of a non-distortionary lump-sum tax/transfer Tt and
issuing public debt. The real government flow budget is given by
dt−1
1 + pit
+Gt = Tt + τ
w
t
Wt
Pt
Lt + τ
c
t Ct + τ
k
t rk,tKt + τ
k
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)
Pt
di+
dt
1 + rt
(2.14)
where dt =
Dt
Pt
is real public debt. The model setup allows for a wide variety of
possible fiscal policy measures. The government can decide on the level of public
consumption, investment and a lump-sum tax or subsidy Tt or changes in distor-
tionary taxation. There are different ways to finance a given level of public spending.
Moreover, the financing decision itself affects the level of economic activity and thus
overall tax revenues.
According to the OECD (2009), during the recent downturn, debt financed increases
in public spending on goods and investment as well as debt financed tax cuts where
among the most popular responses of OECD members. Further evidence for debt-
financed tax subsidies to private households in the US which are intended to stimu-
late private consumption is provided by Sahm et al. (2010). In the short run, debt
is the predominant financing choice in OECD countries.
In the long run, there are several instruments to decrease the level of public debt, e.g.
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the government initiated spending cuts or changes in taxation. However, Alesina
and Perotti (1996) and von Hagen et al. (2001) find that successful consolidations
of public budgets have always been based on spending cuts. This view is confirmed
by Corsetti et al. (2009) who also find that public spending responds to the state of
public finances in a systematic way.
We assume that fiscal expansions are always pre-financed by debt for two reasons:
Firstly, the fiscal shock is intended to stimulate the economy, whereby fiscal au-
thorities postpone the financing decision to avoid a weakening of the desired effects
by increased taxation. Secondly, debt finance allows the government to response
to increased spending requirements rapidly by avoiding time consuming changes in
taxation laws.
Fiscal policy enters the model as an exogenous change in the level of taxation, public
investment or consumption. Fiscal shocks, e.g. a shock to government consumption
Gc,t = ρGc,t−1 + t (2.15)
evolve according to a AR(1) process where 0 < ρ < 1 measures the persistence
of the shock. We restrict our attention to the following set of expansionary fiscal
shocks: A lump-sum subsidy to private households, increases in public spending on
goods and public investment.
After one fiscal year, the government decides on the measures which it finds appro-
priate to return the level of the public debt stock to the assumed target by employing
a simple feedback rule
Taxt = τtdt−1 + τd(dt − d) (2.16)
with τt, τ
b > 0 which may imply changes in each of the tax rates or the level of
public spending on goods and investment. If, for example, the government decides
to use lump-sum taxation as its policy instrument, the above rule implies that
Taxt = Tt for given target level of the public debt stock d = 0. Changes in public
consumption or investment and distortionary taxation complete the set of possible
fiscal instruments.
2.2.4 Dynamic equilibria and calibration of the model
The Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption (2.2),
the optimal wage choice of households(2.3), the law of motion for the capital stock
(2.4), the first order conditions for capital and investment (2.5), (2.6) from the
capital rental sector, the optimal pricing decision for intermediate goods (2.10), the
optimal combination of capital and labor for a given stock of public capital (2.8),
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(2.9) in the intermediate goods sector, the resource constraint of the economy
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (2.17)
coupled with the Fisher equation
1 + it = (1 + rt)Et
Pt+1
Pt
(2.18)
and the government budget constraint (2.14) characterize the dynamic equilibria of
the model in per-capita terms. The model is closed by the assumed feedback rules
for monetary and fiscal policy.
We assume that the government provides a constant level of public investment as
to maintain the public capital stock and consumes a constant amount of goods in
equilibrium. Public spending and investment are constant in real terms. The pre-
cise level is determined by the choice of parameters; more precisely, the values for
distortionary taxation in steady state. Thus, the public capital stock is constant in
a zero inflation steady state.
It is well known that the model has a determinate equilibrium if γ = 1 and the
government relies only on non-distortionary taxation, provided that the monetary
policy follows the Taylor principle φpi > 1. Under these assumption the Ricardian
equivalence holds and the policy problems of the monetary and fiscal authorities are
separable.
According to Leeper (1991) and Woodford (1996), monetary policy is then active
and fiscal policy passive, i.e. taxes or public spending respond sufficiently to the
level of public debt and ensure that the intertemporal budget constraint of the gov-
ernment holds.
Leith and von Thadden (2008) show that this logic needs to be modified if γ < 1.
The level of public debt does not only affect the intertemporal government budget
constraint but enters all equilibrium conditions via the household Euler equation
and therefore becomes a relevant state variable.
Leith and von Thadden (2008) show that the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG
with capital accumulation has determinate equilibria given that monetary and fiscal
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policy follow simple rules as given by (2.11), (2.16) under certain conditions. More
precisely, if the monetary policy is active and the policy instruments of the govern-
ment are chosen such that τ ≥ r, τ d ≥ 0, there exist locally determinate equilibria
characterized by the assumed target level for public debt.
The model has no closed-form solution and is solved numerically by using DYNARE.
The applied approach is a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state
following the approach of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
The model is calibrated on a quarterly basis. A summary of the parameter values
is given in Table 2.1. Regarding the parameters in the utility function we set the
discount factor β = 0.99 and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to 2
χ
= 0.5. For
the latter choice see the discussion in Domeij and Floden (2006). We assume that,
in equilibrium, workers spend one third of their time endowment working.
In the production sector we assume a capital depreciation rate of δ = 0.025 and
set 1
κk
= 0.04 which is a conventional value for quadratic capital adjustment costs
according to Adda and Cooper (2003).
In the Cobb-Douglas function, the elasticity of output with respect to private and
public capital is set to α = 0.3 and θp = 0.1 respectively. The latter value is in the
range of empirical estimates reported in the survey of Romp and de Haan (2007).
Our model features monopolistic competition in the goods and labor markets. We
choose conventional markups of 10%. In the goods market, the average price dura-
tion is set to 4 quarters which corresponds to ξp = 0.75 and is in accordance with
the empirical evidence, see Alvarez et al. (2006). Wage contracts last longer than
price spells, we set ξw = 0.83 which implies one and a half year being the average
duration of wage contracts. The assumption that wages are more sticky than prices
is common in the literature, see Christoffel et al. (2009) or Corsetti et al. (2009) and
the references therein.
For the Taylor rule describing the behavior of the common central bank, we as-
sume a standard value of φpi = 1.5 for the Taylor coefficient. The distortionary
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β 2/χ 2/κk δ α θp ξp ξw τ
c τw τk ρ τd φpi
0.99 0.5 0.04 0.025 0.3 0.1 0.75 0.83 0.1 0.279 0.279 0.9 0.05 1.5
Table 2.1: Calibration of the model parameters
tax rates are set according to Andres and Domenech (2006) who estimate rates of
τ c = 0.1, τw = 0.279, τ k = 0.279 using European data.
For the persistence of public spending shocks, we assume ρ = 0.9. Again, this is a
common choice in a quarterly calibration, see e.g. Corsetti et al. (2009). The fiscal
authorities pre-finance spending measures by issuing public liabilities. The level of
public debt is returned to the target level according to the rule (2.16) where we
assume τt = rt, τ
b = 0.05.
The first choice implies that the government finances interest payments fully by
increased taxation or spending cuts. The second assumption implies that in each
quarter, the government repays five percent of the above-target stock of public debt.
This assumption is more ambitious than the proposals of the European Council for
the Euro Plus Pact of 24/25 March 2011.
We are not aware of any existing empirical consensus for the survival probability γ.
We assume three alternative values which are 0.95, 0.975 and 1. These values imply
expected per-capita planning horizons of 20 and 40 as well as an infinite number of
quarters. Such an approach allows us to explore the effect of failures of the Ricardian
equivalence on the decision making behavior of households.
2.3 Fiscal stabilization policies
We explore the effects of discretionary fiscal measures on output, consumption, la-
bor, investment and the real wage rate as a function of the financing scheme chosen
by the fiscal authorities. In doing so, we compare the effects of typical fiscal measures
taken in the wake of the recent economic crisis, these are increased public consump-
tion, investment and lump-sum transfers to households. Moreover, we evaluate two
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Figure 2.1: A increase in public consumption financed by lump-sum taxation.
alternative financing schemes, which are lump-sum taxation and spending cuts.
We investigate the effect of the characteristic distortion of the Blanchard (1985)-
Yaari (1965) OLG, changes in the survival probability of individuals γ. Our
interpretation of this parameter is that of a measure for myopia. We suggest
γ = 0.95, 0.975, 1 implying planning horizons of either 20 and 40 or an infinite
number of periods.
Up to our best knowledge there is no throughout evaluation as yet of how the
macroeconomic impact of fiscal measures is influenced by the exit strategy of the
government.
2.3.1 Government consumption
Changes in the level of government consumption are a central issue in the empirical
literature on fiscal policy. Moreover, an exogenous increase in dissipative govern-
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ment spending modeled as an exogenous AR(1) process is the standard experiment
in the theoretical literature. According to the OECD (2009), it is also one of the
policy patterns implemented by a typical member country during the recent down-
turn.
It should be emphasized that such a policy experiment is not necessarily equivalent
to the definition of a government spending shock in the empirical literature where
the corresponding shock is usually including public investment and wage spending.
However, one exception from this practice is the approach of Ramey and Shapiro
(1998). The so-called Ramey-Shapiro episodes are characterized by exogenous in-
creases in public defense spending which corresponds to dissipative spending in
theoretical standard models.
The government finances its increased spending on goods in advance by issuing pub-
lic debt. We assume that, for legislative issues, the government decides on how to
return the level of public liabilities to the target levels within four quarters. We
start our discussion by assuming that the fiscal authority decides to use lump-sum
taxation as the financing instrument. The numerical results are given in Fig. 2.1.
As in all illustrations, the horizontal axes indicate the timepath of variables after
the fiscal shocks measured in quarters. Variables are measured in deviations from
steady state where solid lines refer to the Ricardian case , γ = 1, dashed lines and
dotted lines refer to the alternative values of γ = 0.975 and γ = 0.95 respectively.
Under the assumption of Ricardian households γ = 1 the model reproduces the
results of the standard new Keynesian model. A temporary increase in government
consumption which is financed by an increase in future taxation implies a negative
wealth effect. Households respond by adjusting their consumption plans downwards.
The government finances its spending expansions in advance by issuing debt which
implies an increase in the real interest rate, while private investment is crowded out.
An increase in government consumption affects major components of aggregate de-
mand. Public investment remains constant by assumption while public consumption
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is increased. Ricardian households suffer from a decrease in future income as they
have to carry the burden of future taxation in order to return the level of public
debt to the target level.
We observe a persistent increase in output and labor demand. Labor income is the
largest part of household income in the model. Households set their wages above
the marginal disutility of labor in advance and are willing to supply their individual
skills at this rate. Thus, households meet the increased demand for their individ-
ual skills for given wages and we observe an increase in hours worked. We assume
staggered wage setting, thus households cannot adjust their wage calculations im-
mediately.
In particular, the increased demand for final goods allows intermediate goods pro-
ducers to demand higher prices. Prices adjust more frequently than wages with the
effect that the real wage rate declines.
As a consequence, private consumption, the real wage rate as well as private invest-
ment decline. In the long run, as the government fully returns the level of public
liabilities to the steady state level all, variables return to their initial values.
The assumption of uncertain lifetime γ < 1 alters the transmission of fiscal shocks.
The modified Euler equation (2.2) implies that changes in the level of government
debt affect all macroeconomic variables of the model as Bt enters the model as an ad-
ditional state variable. The characteristic distortion of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari
(1965) OLG adds additional wealth channels to the model.
Household consumption demand (2.1) is a function of current and future total wealth
where the weight of each component depends on the survival probability. Given the
assumed exogenous increase in government consumption, the related increase in debt
to pre-finance the increased spending as well as the increase in lump-sum taxation
imply changes in per-capita total wealth.
Labor income is the largest fraction of total wealth. In the period of time during
which the spending shock hits the economy total wealth is reduced as the decrease
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in the real wage rate is not fully offset by increased labor demand. However, the
increased level of public debt adds to total wealth.
One year after the fiscal shock, we witness taxes rising with the aim of reducing the
level of public debt. As a fraction of households resets their wage in each period,
labor income increases.
Depending on the assumed degree of myopia, the effects on total per-capita wealth
of households can either be positive or negative and vary over time. However, even
for the very brave assumption that households have a planning horizon of only five
years, the initial impact on household consumption is negative.
The assumption of finite planning horizons mitigates the negative wealth effects of
a tax-financed increase in public consumption. This is explained by the fact that
a fraction of the increased tax burden falls on the shoulders of future generations.
The stimulus of aggregate demand is more pronounced as compared to the baseline
case which is featuring Ricardian households. However, to enable an initial increase
in household consumption, i.e. a Keynesian multiplier effect of public consumption,
we need to assume extremely myopic households.
This finding confirms the results of Gali et al. (2007) who assume that some house-
holds have no access to financial markets and spend their income in a hand-to-mouth
fashion. However, to obtain a positive response of private consumption to a tax-
financed increase in dissipative government spending, the share of such rule-of-thumb
consumers in the economy has to be very large. A finding that is also confirmed by
Cwik and Wieland (2010).
One major result of our policy experiment is that myopia of households mitigates
negative response of private consumption and investment compared to the case of
Ricardian agents.
We explicitly assume that government spending in steady state is positive and fi-
nanced by constant distortionary tax rates. Thus, we observe that depending on its
effects on macroeconomic variables, the tax-financed increase in public consumption
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Figure 2.2: A increase in public consumption financed by spending cuts.
is self-financing to some degree.
The reason is that changes in household consumption, investment and labor income
directly affect government revenues from distortionary taxation. Additional rev-
enues from distortionary taxes are used to finance debt services. Thus, the increase
in lump-sum taxation required as to finance the expansion of public consumption is
decreased compared to a model that has zero government spending in steady state.
Moreover, this property of the model is convenient as it allows to assess as to which
extend fiscal expansions are self-financing. The argument that by expansionary fis-
cal policies can be financed by the implied increase in consumption and output, i.e.
an increased tax base, is frequently used in the political discussion.
If a fiscal measure is taken with the prospective as to increase economic activity,
the exit strategy might influence the expansionary effects. Again, the government
decides to return the level of accumulated debt to target according to the simple
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feedback rule (2.16). However, instead of lump-sum taxes the government imple-
ments spending cuts as its policy instrument. The numerical results are given in
Fig. 2.2.
If the government decides to finance additional current spending by decreasing fu-
ture spending on goods, the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand substantially
change over time. In the period of time during which the public spending shock hits
the economy, the public demand for goods is increased above the steady state level.
Public debt is increased and the government starts to use part of the current budget
to cover debt services.
The latter measure weakens the expansionary effect of increased public consumption
on aggregate demand. Moreover, the increase in government consumption decreases
over time depending on the persistence of the underlying AR(1) process. With a
lag of four quarters, the government starts to repay the accumulated public debt.
Depending on the choice of the fiscal policy parameter τ d government consumption
is reduced over time.
The direct effect of government consumption on aggregate demand is expansive on
impact and becomes negative over time, depending on the persistence of the spend-
ing shock and parameter choice in the fiscal feedback rule.
Again, we start the discussion of the effects of fiscal policy with the Ricardian case.
The increase in public consumption boosts aggregate demand as discussed above.
However, the responses of private consumption and investment substantially differ
as compared to the case of a tax-financed increase in government consumption.
We observe an immediate decline in household consumption. With a time lag of
six quarters, the response of private consumption turns positive. The same is true
for private investment. However, private investment is decreased for one quarter of
time and persistently increased from the second quarter onwards.
Financing public consumption by a reduction of spending in the future, does sub-
stantially alter the wealth effects of the assumed policy measure. As the level of
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public debt is decreased by spending cuts while increased revenues from distor-
tionary taxation are used for the same purpose, Ricardian households benefit from
positive wealth effects.
However in the initial quarters, the effect on household income is negative as the
implied decrease in the real wage rate is not fully compensated by increased labor
demand. Labor income is decreased. As soon as households are allowed to adjust
their wage-setting decision, this effect vanishes.
In the medium and long run, households benefit from increased labor income and
interest payments on government bonds which are in their portfolios. Thus, con-
sumption and investment increase. Households use their increased income to con-
sume and save more. In the long run, all variables return to the initial steady state.
Household myopia has strong effects on this transmission mechanism. Finitely-lived
households are exposed to different wealth effects as their expected total wealth is
calculated over a finite number of future time periods. Moreover, non-Ricardian
households perceive government debt as net wealth and do not necessarily survive
until the government has returned the level of public liabilities to the initial level.
Non-Ricardian households suffer more by the losses in labor income and benefit less
from interest payments implied by the assumed financing strategy. However, their
total wealth is increased which allows them to adjust their consumption plans up-
wardly. They consume more but do not necessarily increase their saving by the same
amount as Ricardian households do. Moreover, the real interest rate is increased
by the public demand for capital to finance the increase in public spending. Thus,
private investment is crowded out. The output stimulus is larger than in the case of
Ricardian households and the same is true for the increase in hours worked. More-
over, the decrease in the real wage rate is more pronounced, too.
As a consequence, the fiscal expansion does stimulate aggregate output substantially.
The fiscal stimulus is self-financing to a larger degree than under the alternative fi-
nancing scheme of levying taxes. In particular, the response of private investment
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allows us to identify the appropriate modelling assumption, that is either Ricardian
or non-Ricardian households in empirical data.
In summary, we find that assuming finite horizons alters the impact of fiscal policy
on macroeconomic variables in cases where policy measures imply changes in the in-
tertemporal distribution of household income. In general, financing additional public
demand for goods by taxation is effective, if the government intends to increase out-
put. However, if the government tries to stimulate household consumption, choosing
future spending cuts is the superior choice.
In any case, to enable the model to predict Keynesian multiplier effects of public
consumption we need to assume a very low value for the survival probability γ, or
in other words, take it that households are very short-sighted.
We conclude that it can be very misleading to ignore the financing decision of the
government when evaluating the effects of fiscal stimulus packages in theoretical
models. A result that is confirmed by the work of Corsetti et al. (2009). However,
as discussed above, stimulus packages implemented in practice are rarely restricted
to changes in public consumption.
2.3.2 A lump-sum transfer to households
According to the OECD (2009) direct transfers to consumers were frequently part
of the stimulus packages implemented in response to the recent economic downturn.
Moreover, Sahm et al. (2010) report two lump-sum subsidies to US consumers over
the last decade.
Hence, we are interested in the predictions of our model. We assume an exogenous
increase in lump-sum transfers. The government finances the subsidy in advance by
public debt. With a time lag of four quarters, the level of public liabilities is returned
to the target level according to the fiscal feedback rule (2.16). Again, we compare
two different financing instruments, these are lump-sum taxation and spending cuts
in public consumption.
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Figure 2.3: A lump-sum subsidy to households financed by future taxation.
For the time being, we assume that public liabilities are returned to the target level
by using lump-sum taxation as the policy instrument. The numerical results are
given in Fig. 2.3. Lump-sum subsidies financed by future lump-sum taxation are
an intertemporal redistribution of income. Current generations receive a subsidy
which is financed by future taxation. The expansive effects depend entirely on the
consumption-savings decisions of households.
If γ = 1, the Ricardian equivalence holds. We observe no effects on macroeconomic
variables except for changes in public liabilities and lump-sum tax rates.
If households face uncertain planing horizons, public debt enters the model’s equilib-
rium conditions through the modified Euler equation (2.2) and becomes a relevant
state variable. Non-Ricardian households perceive public debt as net wealth.
In the initial equilibrium, the level of public spending equals its revenues from dis-
tortionary taxation. From the time period onwards at which the fiscal shock hits
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the economy we observe two effects on the level of lump-sum taxes: Firstly, the tem-
porary subsidy which follows an AR(1) process and diminishes over time. Secondly,
the government starts to finance the subsidy by issuing debt and levying lump-sum
taxes to pay the debt service.
With a time lag of four quarters, the government starts to return the level of public
debt to the target level which implies a further increase in lump-sum taxation.
Thus, the effect of a lump-sum subsidy on total wealth is positive in the beginning
and turns negative as soon as the taxes levied to return the level of public liabilities
exceed the subsidy. The lower the probability to survive, i.e. the more pronounced
the assumed myopia of households, the stronger is the positive effect on total wealth.
Wealth effects entirely depend on γ. Non-Ricardian households take the opportu-
nity and use the additional income to increase their consumption.
Apart from these effects on total wealth the fiscal shock affects the economy also
via a second channel, its effects on the real interest rate. The increase in public
liabilities drives real interest rates up which crowds-out private investment. Overall,
aggregate demand is increased.
Firms increase their production and demand more labor. Moreover, producers take
the opportunity to adjust their prices upwards. As labor is demand driven we ob-
serve an increase in hours worked. Because the adjustment of wages is more sluggish
than price adjustment, the real wage rate declines.
In the long run, the level of public debt is returned to the target level and the model
returns to the initial steady state.
We conclude that a lump-sum subsidy financed by lump-sum taxation is only effec-
tive if we assume failures of the Ricardian equivalence. If households behave in a
non-Ricardian manner it boosts aggregate demand by stimulating private consump-
tion.
We evaluate the impact of the financing decision by assuming the temporary lump-
sum subsidy which is financed by future spending cuts, see Fig. 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: A lump-sum subsidy to households financed by spendings cuts.
If the government decides to finance additional current spending by decreasing fu-
ture spending on goods, the overall effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand as
well as the wealth effects on private agents are substantially altered.
The financing of current subsidies by future spending cuts changes the impact on the
economy in two dimensions: Firstly, the fiscal measure corresponds to a temporary
balanced-budget tax cut. The measure is pre-financed by debt and the spending cut
postponed to the future. Secondly, financing tax cuts by future cuts in government
demand implies a decrease in future public demand and therefore aggregate demand
for final goods in the future.
We start the discussion with the assumption of Ricardian households. These recog-
nize that the assumed policy implies an increased income. Thus, they adjust their
consumption plans upwards. Moreover, the increased demand for goods drives pro-
duction and therefore labor demand upwards.
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Households supply labor at given rates. Thus, hours worked increase. As wages are
adjusted less frequently than prices, we observe a decrease in the real wage rate.
Overall, Ricardian agents use their additional income to consume and save more in
the short run. Aggregate demand is increased.
However, as the government finances the lump-sum subsidy by spending cuts we
observe a decrease in aggregate demand with a time lag of more than 30 quarters.
The same is true for hours worked. As soon as the government has returned public
liabilities to the target level all variables return to their steady state values.
For non-Ricardian households the overall effects are similar. However, the transmis-
sion mechanism is not the same as public debt enters the equilibrium conditions of
the models via the per-capita Euler equation. Thus, the positive wealth effects on
current generations are more pronounced. We observe a stronger boost of aggregate
output and labor demand in the short and medium term.
The key difference between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households is the response
of private investment. We observe that household spending on investment goods is
decreased compared to Ricardian households.
The response of private investment even becomes negative for low values of γ. The
reason for this development is, that the finite life expectancy of non-Ricardian house-
holds do not expect to survive until the level of public liabilities is returned to the
initial level. Thus, they do not expect to experience future periods in which public
spending is cut and aggregate demand and therefore labor income falls below the
equilibrium level. Consequently, finitely-lived households save less to smooth future
consumption.
In summary, a tax-financed lump-sum subsidy to households is only effective in
terms of boosting aggregate demand if households behave in a non-Ricardian man-
ner. However, if the Ricardian equivalence holds, the government still can stimulate
private consumption and therefore aggregate demand. This implies that the gov-
ernment decides to finance these measures in times of economic distress by future
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Figure 2.5: A increase in public investment financed by future taxation.
spending cuts.
Thus, the exit strategy as well as the intertemporal optimizing behavior of house-
hold matters for the effect of debt-financed tax cuts. Moreover, this result carries
over to the case of distortionary taxation, e.g. a temporary cut in labor income tax
financed by future spending cuts.
In particular, a tax cut is more effective in stabilizing private consumption while
in terms of stabilizing employment government consumption and tax cuts perform
well. However, in both cases the myopicness of households as well as the financing
decision of the government have a large impact on the stabilizing properties of fiscal
policy.
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2.3.3 Public investment
Public investment in infrastructure was part of virtually all stimulus packages re-
leased as response to the current economic crisis. We assume an exogenous shock
to public investment accordingly and compare two alternative exit strategies which
are taxation and spending cuts.
Up to our best knowledge, the impact of spending cuts as a potential financing de-
cision on public investment is evaluated for the first time. We wish to emphasize
that, with the exception of the Ramey-Shapiro approach, public investment is part
of the empirical definition of government consumption.
However, there are other theoretical models allowing for the assessment of public
investment. Our approach to public investment is similar to that of Linnemann and
Schabert (2006). In their model households are Ricardian and public investment
enters as a flow into the production function of the private sector. However, Lin-
nemann and Schabert (2006) abstract from private investment and the possibility
of spending cuts as to finance public investment. We start our discussion assuming
that the fiscal authorities decides to use lump-sum taxation as the preferred financ-
ing instrument, see Fig. 2.5.
Under the assumption of Ricardian households, the results are similar to the effect
of a positive productivity shock in the standard RBC/new Keynesian model. Public
investment increases productivity in the intermediate goods sector. For each combi-
nation of the productive private inputs, capital and labor, the firm sector produces
more of the final good.
Households use their increased income to consume and save more. The reason is
that they anticipate increased future taxation as to finance that policy measure.
While public consumption remains constant, we observe a pronounced increase of
aggregate demand.
The latter, once again, implies an increased demand for labor and, by less frequent
adjustments of wages, a decrease in the real wage rate. However, the increase in
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consumption demand of Ricardian households comes along with a time lag. The
reason for such a phenomenon is that households suffer labor-income losses by the
decrease in real wages. They adjust their consumption plans as soon as they have
an opportunity to adjust their wage calculations.
Similar to the prediction of the standard RBC/New Keynesian model for a tem-
porary productivity shock, we observe that output, consumption, investment and
labor all rise above their equilibrium values.
By the same mechanism as outlined above, the assumption of uncertain lifetime
γ < 1 alters the transmission of fiscal shocks. Consumption demand is a function of
current and future total wealth. Given the assumed exogenous increase in public in-
vestment, the related increase in debt as to pre-finance the increased spending and
the increase in lump-sum taxation imply changes in per-capita total wealth after
four quarters of time.
The crucial difference is, once again, that finite lifetimes imply that households do
not expect to survive long enough to pay the full amount of taxation required as to
return the level of public debt to its target level. Thus, all effects described above
are more pronounced and, they increase as a function of decreasing life expectancy
or myopia.
If the government decides to choose cuts in the budget for public consumption
in order to finance a temporary increase in public investment, we observe similar
effects, see Fig. 2.6.
A temporary increase in public investment does increase the production possibili-
ties in our model economy. Assuming that the government finances this measure
by decreasing future public consumption, the negative wealth effects of this policy
choice diminishes.
Although a decrease in future public demand reduces aggregate demand for final
goods in the future, the implied income loss is smaller than in case of increased tax-
ation to finance the same policy pattern. As a consequence, Ricardian households
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Figure 2.6: A increase in public investment financed by spending cuts.
increase their demand for consumption and investment purposes.
Again, if we assume uncertain planning horizon of households the response of
macroeconomic variables to a boost in public investment is more pronounced.
Again, we observe that output, consumption, investment and labor all rise above
their equilibrium values. The real wage rage is decreased because wages adjust less
frequently than prices. However, after a period of three to five years, depending on
the assumed value of the survival probability, real wages rise above the equilibrium
level.
In summary, public investment is a powerful instrument to stimulate aggregate de-
mand and, in particular, household consumption. If the government decides to
finance public investment by decreasing future government consumption, the stim-
ulus is amplified.
Contrary to the case of public consumption we find that public investment does
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yield Keynesian multiplier effects. In particular, we find that these effects are ro-
bust under different assumptions regarding the financing decision of the government.
We also found that these effects do not crucially depend on the assumed degree of
household myopia. However, if public investment is financed by future cuts in public
consumption, the Keynesian multiplier on output is more pronounced.
We find that the exit strategy together with the intertemporal optimizing behavior
of households influence the effects of public investment. Failures of the Ricardian
equivalence have only small quantitative effects, unless these are very pronounced.
2.4 Conclusions
In this paper we study the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables. We
focus on the response of output, consumption, hours worked, private investment
and the real wage rate to fiscal shocks as a function of the financing decision of the
government.
We compare various fiscal instruments that are deployed in response to the recent
economic downturn: government spending on goods, tax cuts targeted at house-
holds and public investment. Moreover, we explore how failures of the Ricardian
equivalence alter the transmission of fiscal policy shocks in a closed economy model
which is featuring sticky wages and prices.
We find that government spending shocks always stimulate output. We observe a
decrease in the real wage rate and an increase in hours worked. However, the effect
of decreased real wages dominates and households suffer from an income loss as
labor income is the major fraction of private income.
Important components of aggregate demand such as household consumption and
private investment are sensitive to the assumed financing strategy as well as to the
assumed value of the survival probability.
If we assume that public consumption is financed by increased taxation households
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adjust their consumption plans downwards and private investment is crowded out
unless we assume that households are very short-sighted.
An increase in public consumption that is financed by future spending cuts does al-
ways stimulate output and household consumption. Private investment is crowded
in unless we assume large deviations from Ricardian behavior.
More importantly, under the assumption of a tax-financed increase of public con-
sumption, we require a degree of household myopia that cannot be confirmed in the
data to enable public consumption to stimulate private consumption. The alterna-
tive financing decision of future spending cuts enables the government to stimulate
output and private consumption at the same time, no matter if households behave
in a Ricardian manner or not. However, for both cases we observe Keynesian mul-
tiplier effects only if we assume unrealistically short-sighted household behavior.
The effect of a lump-sum subsidy to households is highly sensitive to both, the as-
sumed value of the survival probability γ as well as to the financing decision of the
government. A lump-sum subsidy financed by lump-sum taxation has no effect on
the behavior of Ricardian households. Only if we assume failures of the Ricardian
equivalence, such a measure affects the consumption-savings decision of households.
In general, lump-sum subsidies to households stimulate private consumption if γ < 1.
This effect is independently of the exit strategy. However, if such subsidies are tax-
financed the positive effect on consumption is mitigated by the negative wealth
effects of increased taxation. In case of financing direct transfers by future cuts in
public spending the response of private consumption is always positive.
Finally, public investment does have similar effects as a positive productivity shock
in standard RBC and new Keynesian models. Generally, public investment increases
productivity. Households use their increased income to consume and save more and
we observe a Keynesian multiplier effect.
This is the case for all possible values of the survival probability γ and independent
of the financing decision. The effect is more pronounced, if public investment is
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financed by future spending cuts.
In summary, we find that assuming finite horizons alters the impact of fiscal policy
on macroeconomic variables in cases where policy measures imply changes in the
intertemporal distribution of household income.
However, in cases where we cannot observe Keynesian multiplier effects in the Ri-
cardian baseline scenario, we need to assume unrealistically short-sighted household
behavior to enable fiscal measures to increase output by more than one-to-one. On
the other hand, Keynesian multiplier effects can be observed by deviating from the
standard policy experiment of a tax-financed increase in public consumption. An
extension of the model to allow for public investment, does allow for Keynesian mul-
tipliers even in the Ricardian case. Moreover, extending the set of fiscal instruments
shows that these are more pronounced if public investment is financed by future
cuts in public consumption.
In general, financing additional public demand for goods by taxation is effective, if
the government intends to increase output. However, if the government tries to stim-
ulate household consumption, choosing future spending cuts is the superior choice.
We conclude that it can be very misleading to ignore the financing decision of the
government when evaluating the effects of fiscal stimulus packages in theoretical
models.
Thus, our results support the policy advice of the OECD (2009), which also em-
phasizes the importance of the financing decision of the government. We find that
measures such as increases in public investment and tax cuts which are targeted at
households have indeed the potential to yield double-dividends. In particular, this
is the case when these measures are financed by future spending cuts.
Our results suggest that a single deviation from the standard model, e.g. failures
of the Ricardian equivalence, is not sufficient to reconcile theory and empirical evi-
dence.
Regarding empirical work, we conclude that an identification scheme for fiscal shocks
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that abstracts from the financing decisions of the government, may lead to mislead-
ing empirical results. In particular, in cases where fiscal expansions are financed by a
combination of spending cuts and increased taxation this might lead to inconclusive
empirical results. The approach of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) seems well suited
to put the sign restrictions implied by our model to an empirical test.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal stabilization policies in a
monetary union
3.1 Introduction
In response to the economic turmoil caused by the financial crisis of 2007, on Novem-
ber 26, 2008, the European Commission initiated a co-ordinated fiscal policy re-
sponse of the European Union, the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) to
halt the economic downturn. This fiscal stimulus package had a volume of approxi-
mately 200 billion euros which corresponds to 1.5% of the union-wide GDP.
The major objectives of the Commission were to stabilize employment, strengthen
the purchasing power of European consumers and to invest in Europe’s future in the
form of public investment programs. The Commission emphasized the importance
of a co-ordinated approach in which, depending on their fiscal position, all member
states were encouraged to launch national fiscal stimulus packages simultaneously.
The approach of the Commission reflects central institutional characteristics of the
EU. The EU member states are highly integrated by the single European market.
Moreover, seventeen EU member states form the European monetary union (EMU)
and share a common currency.
Despite this deep integration, there is no substantial union budget which would al-
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low for the launch of a union-wide fiscal stimulus package. Instead, the Commission
had to rely on the member states’ willingness to implement fiscal policy measures
at national level. The European Commission expected substantial spillovers from
national fiscal stimulus packages. The co-ordination of fiscal policy was expected to
amplify the expansionary effects of fiscal policy and to avoid free riding problems at
the same time.
Regarding the composition of individual national stimulus packages, the Commis-
sion suggested a combination of public spending increases and tax cuts targeted at
households. In fact, increasing public investment was the most favored fiscal mea-
sure with an emphasis on improving Europe’s infrastructure in view of strengthening
economic growth in the long run.
The effects of fiscal policy on key macroeconomic variables such as consumption,
employment and output are a lively field of empirical research. The predominant
approaches trace back to the seminal work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
Mountford and Uhlig (2005, 2009) which all are based on structural vector autore-
gressive (SVAR) methods in order to identify fiscal shocks directly in high frequency
data.
The alternative narrative approach suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) identi-
fies fiscal policy shocks in the US by the study of contemporary newspapers. They
find several exogenous fiscal shocks in the form of military build-ups.
The empirical work on fiscal policy shocks is strongly focused on shocks to govern-
ment consumption. In general, with the exception of Ramey and Shapiro (1998),
spending shocks always include public consumption and investment.
Following these seminal contributions, numerous researchers contributed to this em-
pirical literature over the last decade. Excellent surveys of the empirical results and
the related methodological issues are provided by Perotti (2007), Gali et al. (2007)
and von Hagen and Wyplosz (2008).
The main results are that the effects of fiscal policy depend on the choice of instru-
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ments, e.g. public consumption or investment and the related financing decision.
Regarding an increase of public consumption, the empirical literature reached the
conclusion that output, consumption and employment rise. We conclude that the
empirical literature renders some support to the idea of fiscal stabilization policies
advocated by the European Commission in the EERP.
The EERP includes a wide set of fiscal instruments which are affecting the spend-
ing side as well as the revenue side of the public budget. Furthermore, the EERP
implicitly assumes that a specific fiscal instrument is appropriate to stabilize a par-
ticular macroeconomic variable. The expectation that public consumption increases
national output or that tax cuts increase household demand are examples for this
approach.
The major objective of the EERP according to European Commission (2008) was
the stabilization of output. Fiscal measures targeted to stabilize employment and
private demand where suggested to further strengthen the expansive effects of public
consumption and investment on output.
Thus, the impact of fiscal measures on national output is a key criterion for the
evaluation of fiscal policy. Implicitly, the EERP assumes that the costs of fiscal
policy in terms of debt and ultimately increased future taxation or spending cuts
are smaller than the benefits in terms of increased output.
The idea that fiscal policy has the power to increase aggregate demand more than
one-to-one is known as Keynesian multiplier effect. In Keynesian models, aggregate
demand consists of private demand for consumption and investment, net exports
and public consumption. Private demand is a function of current after-tax income.
Thus, a debt financed increase in public spending increases aggregate demand more
than one-to-one as private demand is crowded in.
Modern economic standard models are based on the optimizing behavior of agents.
The classical RBC models (e.g. Baxter and King (1993)) as well as standard new
Keynesian models (e.g. Gali (2008)) predict that an increase in public spending
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does stimulate aggregate demand but the effect is mitigated by decreases in private
consumption.
The key to this prediction is the validity of the Ricardian equivalence. It implies
that debt and lump-sum taxation are equivalent financing instruments. Fiscal policy
enters standard models typically as an exogenous shock where debt and taxation
are the only financing instruments of the government. Thus, an increase in public
demand always implies a decrease in permanent income. Households respond by
adjusting their consumption plans downward and work more to offset the income
loss.
These assumptions potentially ignore important dimensions of fiscal policy measures
that were implemented during the recent downturn. This does also apply to a large
part of the empirical evidence. Fiscal policy measures which aimed to mitigate the
recent economic turmoil were not restricted to the spending side of the public bud-
get but included increased public spending as well as temporary tax cuts targeted
at households. In particular, spending increases and tax cuts were regularly imple-
mented simultaneously and financed by public debt. Interestingly, a debt-financed
tax cut, among the measures expected to halt and even reverse an economic down-
turn will have no effect at all in standard models of fiscal policy.
Moreover, quite contrary to the standard modelling choice of an exogenous spending
process, the empirical evidence suggests that public spending responds to the state
of the economy in a systematic way. Estimating fiscal policy rules Gali and Perotti
(2003) find that public spending does respond to the state of public finances, in
particular, the accumulated stock of public liabilities. A finding which is confirmed
by the earlier work of Alesina and Perotti (1996) and von Hagen et al. (2001) who
find no empirical support for the assumption of short run fluctuations in tax rates
as to balance the government budget. They find that successful consolidations are
predominantly based on spending cuts.
Corsetti et al. (2009) find that increases in public spending are financed by increased
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taxation and spending cuts. According to them, fiscal expansions are followed by
decreases in public spending below the trend. A phenomenon labeled as spending
reversals by Corsetti et al. (2009).
The effects of fiscal policy are not restricted to the implementing country but have
implications also for their trading partners. Beetsma et al. (2006) estimate the
spillovers from fiscal shocks via trade flows in Europe. They find that fiscal ex-
pansions boost economic activity in the implementing country and have substantial
positive spillover effects on its trading partners.
A number of researchers aim to reconcile the predictions of theoretical models with
empirical evidence. The predominant approach follows the suggestion of Gali et
al. (2007) who allow for failures of the Ricardian equivalence by assuming that a
fraction of households cannot participate in credit markets.
These so-called rule-of-thumb consumers spend their disposable income in each pe-
riod of time. However, their approach depends crucially on the choice of parameters,
i.e. the share of credit constraint consumers. The main objective of Gali et al. (2007)
is to enable a fiscal expansion to crowd in private demand. To obtain such a result,
they need to assume a large share of credit-constrained consumers. An assumption
that, according to Coenen and Straub (2005) and Cwik and Wieland (2010), cannot
be confirmed in the data.
Another route is taken by Linnemann and Schabert (2006) who show that produc-
tive government spending in an otherwise standard new Keynesian model generates
effects that are similar to the empirical evidence. In particular, they demonstrate a
positive response of employment and household consumption to a fiscal shock.
Corsetti et al. (2009) extend an otherwise standard new Keynesian open economy
model by a fiscal feedback rule which enables a systematic response of public spend-
ing to the level of public liabilities. In their model, the spending process is not exoge-
nous. Corsetti et al. (2009) show that the financing decision, taxation or spending
cuts, of the government has strong effects on the behavior of private households.
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Government consumption has the power to crowd in private demand, if it is, at
least to some degree, financed by future spending cuts. In subsequent work Corsetti
et al. (2010) and Corsetti et al. (2011) find that the national effects of fiscal policy
and the spillovers depend on the financing decision of the government, the size of
the implementing country relative to the world economy as well as the trade elas-
ticity. Among these factors, the assumed financing strategy has by far the strongest
impact. However, the authors focus on public consumption while ignoring fiscal
measures such as tax cuts or public investment.
In previous work, we found that the fiscal instrument employed, public consumption
or tax cuts targeted at households, and the assumed financing strategy, taxation or
future spending cuts, have a large impact on the way fiscal policy affects the econ-
omy. In a two-country New Open Economy Macroeconomics model of a currency
union featuring an overlapping generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari
(1965) type chapter 1 shows that, depending on the financing decision of the gov-
ernment, fiscal policy measures can have very different effects on consumption and
output. The spillovers of national fiscal policy depend on the composition of govern-
ment spending, the type of the fiscal measure and the cross-country substitutability
between goods.
In chapter 2 we suggest a closed economy model of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari
(1965) type and look at the impact of additional distortions such as staggered wage
setting and distortionary taxation to evaluate the effects of fiscal policy further. We
compared public consumption, investment and tax cuts targeted at households and
explored how failures of the Ricardian equivalence as well as alternative financing
decisions alter the transmission of fiscal policy shocks. We found that both, the
financing decision and possible failures of the Ricardian equivalence have a large
impact on how fiscal measures affect the economy.
We conclude that standard models potentially miss important dimensions of fiscal
decision making. Removing the restriction of fiscal instruments to exogenous spend-
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ing shocks and considering taxation being the only instruments of the government
as well as allowing for failures of the Ricardian equivalence moves theoretical pre-
dictions closer to the empirical consensus.
The EU gave an example of swift decision making. Mid-December 2008, the Euro-
pean Council approved the EERP as proposed by the European Commission, which
was implemented by member states immediately. We focus on Germany.
On January 12, 2009, the German government decided on the corresponding national
stimulus package which was labeled Konjunkturpaket II. It passed the Deutsche Bun-
destag on February 13 2009, followed by the approval of the Bundesrat on February
20 2009. The law entered into force on March 6, 2009. The Konjunkturpaket II
had a total volume of 50 billion euros and was focused on public consumption and
infrastructure spending as well as tax cuts and subsidies which were targeted at
households.
The OECD (2009) estimated that, together with an earlier stimulus package, the
fiscal packages released in Germany had a size of around 3.5% of the German GDP
in the years 2009 to 2010.
The high expectations of the European Commission and national governments in
the power of fiscal policy to halt and even reverse an economic downturn by expan-
sionary fiscal policy as well as the empirical consensus outlined above is difficult to
reconcile with economic standard models.
We extend the model evaluated in 2 and propose a two-country New Open Econ-
omy Macroeconomics model of a currency union which is featuring an overlapping
generations structure of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) type as well as monop-
olistic frictions and staggered adjustment in the goods and labor market. We allow
for public investment and distortionary taxation. This enables us to study a wide
range of fiscal measures including different ways of financing a given level of public
spending.
We want to assess the impact of the most important components of the EERP on
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the economy of the implementing country, together with the spillovers on the other
members of the EMU. The EERP suggests increased public spending on goods, pub-
lic investment and tax cuts targeted at households as adequate fiscal measures to
halt the recent economic downturn. We compare the impact of alternative financing
schemes, taxation or future spending cuts. The phenomenon of spending reversals
and instruments of fiscal policy are apart from public consumption rarely evaluated
in the theoretical literature.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. Firstly, up to our best knowledge, we
are the first comparing public consumption and investment as well as tax cuts by
assuming alternative financing schemes. Secondly, we explore fiscal policy in a full-
fledged model of a monetary union with an emphasis on the impact of the financing
decision and the possibility of failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
We than further ask whether the fiscal policy measures suggested by the EERP have
the effects as envisioned by the European Commission when adopted to a full-fledged
two-country model that qualitatively captures the empirical evidence.
We find that expansions in public consumption always increase national output
and employment. The response of private consumption is sensitive to the financing
choice of the government.
If financed by future taxation, public consumption decreases wealth and consump-
tion demand of Ricardian consumers persistently. The alternative financing choice of
future spending cuts mitigates the negative wealth effect. The consumption demand
of Ricardian households is decreased on impact but quickly returns to its pre-shock
level, but moves to a higher level as compared to the pre-shock level before the
financing decision comes fully into effect. However, in any case the multiplier effect
on national output is smaller than one.
The introduction of finite lifetimes yields a level of household consumption that is
always higher as compared to the case of Ricardian consumers in response to a tax-
financed increase in public consumption. To enable the model to predict an increase
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in household consumption and therefore a Keynesian multiplier effect on domestic
output, we need to assume a very high degree of household myopia.
However, if public consumption is financed by future spending cuts, non-Ricardian
households always respond by increasing their demand for consumption goods and
we obtain Keynesian multipliers on national output.
A lump-sum subsidy to households which is financed by lump-sum taxes in the fu-
ture has no effect at all in a Ricardian model. Non-Ricardian households respond
by a persistent increase in consumption. Driven by household demand, domestic
output and employment increase.
Financing a temporary subsidy to consumers by future spending cuts, alters the
model prediction substantially. Output, employment and household consumption
increase on impact whether, we allow for failures of the Ricardian equivalence or
not. But, in both cases we find no Keynesian multipliers on output.
We find that increases in public investment have effects similar to a positive produc-
tivity shock in the home country. No matter how the government decides to finance
these measures and independently of possible failures of the Ricardian equivalence,
public investment increases domestic output, employment and household consump-
tion. The Keynesian multiplier on national output is always larger than one. How-
ever, we find no double dividends of public investment.
Moreover, the European Commission expected substantial positive spillovers and
thus free riding problems. In our model spillovers are driven by household con-
sumption and can be even negative on impact. In the medium term, the spillovers
of fiscal policy shocks are always positive. Output, consumption and employment
abroad increase.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets out a two-
country Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG of a currency union. In section 3.3,
we analyze the positive aspects of various fiscal policy measures including policy
transmission and spillover effects. Finally, section 3.4 presents the conclusions and
101
possible extensions of the model.
3.2 The Model
We develop a dynamic, two-country, general equilibrium model of a monetary union
which is featuring monopolistic competition and staggered adjustment in the goods
and the labor market. We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume staggered wage and
price setting of the Calvo (1983) type. Households are introduced in the form of
overlapping generations following the discrete-time version of the Blanchard (1985)-
Yaari (1965) OLG by Frenkel et al. (1996).
We identify one country as the home country H while the other country is referred to
as the foreign country F . In the domestic country, a cohort of n ∈ [0, 1] households
is born in each period of time whereas (1− n) agents are born abroad. Therefore,
the population in the domestic country is
∑∞
a=0 γ
an = n
1−γ and
1−n
1−γ is the population
abroad. This implies a constant world population that is normalized to one as we
assume that a fraction of 1− γ of the population is dying in each period of time.
The characteristic distortion of the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG model is the
introduction of uncertain lifespans by a single parameter γ, the survival probability
of individual households. Households have no bequest motive. Finite lifespans imply
that an intertemporal redistribution of wealth alters the expected permanent income
in the remaining lifespan of an individual and thus lead to failures of the Ricardian
equivalence.
3.2.1 Households
We discuss the behavior of an individual domestic household with the notion that
similar equations hold for foreign households. Domestic households h ∈ [0, n] share
identical preferences and maximize their utility over consumption C and leisure
(1− L) , L ∈ [0, 1]. The certainty equivalent utility function of an individual domes-
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tic household reads
EtUt(h) =
∞∑
s=t
(γβ)
s−t
[
lnCa+s−t,s(h) +
χ0
1− χ (1− La+s−t,s(h))
1−χ
]
(3.1)
where β, χ0, χ > 0 and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability to survive until the next period
of time. The parameter χ > 0 measures the utility of time spend out of work.
The individual real period t budget constraint of a domestic household of age a reads
Fa,t(h) + (1 + τ
c
t )Ca,t(h) =
1
γ
Fa−1,t−1(h)(1 + rt−1) + (3.2)
(1− τwt )wa,t(h)La,t(h)− Tt + (1− τkt )
∫ n
0
Πt(i)di+ Π
k
t (3.3)
where τ c, τ k, τw are distortionary tax rates on consumption, capital and labor. w
is the real wage rate and F = D + B denotes the agents total asset holdings de-
nominated in units of the composite consumption good. D are national government
bonds and B bonds which are issued by private households home or abroad.
T is a lump-sum tax and rt−1 the real interest rate paid on bond holdings between
t−1 and t. We assume that households receive an equal share of national profits in-
dependent of age.
∫ n
0
Πt(i)di,Π
k
t are the real individual shares of profits of national
final goods producers and capital rental firms respectively received by a domestic
individual.
Productivity and consumption preferences are assumed to be independently of age.
Thus, we are able to calculate per-capita variables by aggregating across ages and
then dividing by population size.
Individual and per-capita variables coincide in the model. Variables, without in-
dividual h and age a index denote per-capita values. The domestic households
optimizing behavior yields the consumption function
Ct =
1− γβ
1 + τ ct
[(1 + rt−1)Ft−1 +Ht + Ωt] (3.4)
where (1− γβ) is the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth
Ωt =
∞∑
s=t
ψt,sγ
s−t [(1− τks )Πs + Πks]
the household financial wealth and
Ht =
∞∑
s−t
ψt,sγ
s−t [(1− τws )wtLt − Tt]
the human wealth in per-capita terms. The present value factor is defined as
ψt,s =
 ψt,s = 1 if s = tψt,s = 1(1+rt)·...·(1+rt+s) if s > t
The optimizing behavior of households implies the following per-capita Euler equa-
tion for the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption
(1 + τ ct+1)Ct+1 +
1− γ
γ
(1− γβ)Ft = (1 + τ ct )(1 + rt)βCt (3.5)
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We assume that each individual domestic household h, independently of age, faces
a downward-sloping demand curve for his individual skill
Lt(h) =
(
Wt(h)
Wt
)−φl
Lt
where φl is the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor inputs in
production, Wt is the aggregate labor demand and Wt the aggregate nominal wage.
Individual workers have monopolistic power on the labor market which allows them
to set their individual nominal wage rate Wt(h).
We follow Calvo (1983) and assume that in any period, only a fraction of workers
can reset its wage with probability 0 < (1 − ξw) < 1. If a worker is not allowed to
reset his wage rate for j ≥ 1 periods, it is updated according to the rule
Wt+j = pi
j
MUWt(h)
where piMU is the inflation target of the common monetary authority in the monetary
union. The optimal wage choice of an individual household that resets his individual
wage rate in period t in per-capita terms reads
wt(h) =
(
χ0
φl
1− φl
)
Et
∑∞
s=t (γβξw)
s−t
(1− Ls(h))−χ (1 + τ cs )Cs(h)
Et
∑∞
s=t (γβξw)
s−t
(1− τws )ws
Et
∞∑
s=t
(γβξw)
s−t
s−t∏
k=1
∆wt+k(3.6)
where ∆w−1t =
piWt−1
Wt
and wt(h) =
Wt(h)
Wt
. The law of motion for the aggregate wage
level reads
Wt = ξwpiWt−1 + (1− ξw)Wt(h)
We assume that each country in the world economy specializes in the production
of a homogeneous national consumption good. The per-capita consumption basket
of domestic households is given by
Ct =
[
(1− (1− n)ϕ) 1θC
θ−1
θ
H,t + ((1− n)ϕ)
1
θ C
θ−1
θ
F,t
] θ
θ−1
(3.7)
Following Tille (2001) we refer to θ as the cross-country substitutability or trade
elasticity. The assumed functional form of the consumption basket follows Suther-
land (2005) and Corsetti et al. (2009). The parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1] measures the
relative weight of national goods in the household’s consumption basket. A value
of ϕ < 1 implies that the fraction of domestically produced goods in the household
consumption basket exceeds the share of domestic production in the world economy,
i.e. home bias in private consumption.
The corresponding consumer price index is defined as the minimum expenditure to
buy one unit of the composite consumption good and given by
Pt =
(
(1− (1− n)ϕ)P 1−θH,t + ((1− n)ϕ)P 1−θF,t
) 1
1−θ
(3.8)
We assume no impediments to trade. Hence, the law of one price PH = P
∗
H holds
where an asterisk denotes a foreign country variable. Home and foreign agents are
assumed to have symmetric preferences which are invariant across ages.
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A monetary union implies a nominal exchange rate of one, whereby both countries
share a common currency. However, a value of ϕ < 1, i.e. home bias in private
consumption, implies deviations from the purchasing power parity. Qt =
P ∗t
Pt
defines
the real exchange rate.
The terms of trade (tot) are defined as the ratio of the price of a domestically
produced consumption bundle and a bundle of goods produced abroad.
TOT =
PH
PF
(3.9)
Thus, from the domestic household’s point of view, an increase in the tot is con-
sidered to be an improvement. Domestic households maximize their utility from
consumption, given their budget in any period of time. We obtain
CH,t = (1− (1− n)ϕ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−θ
Ct CF,t = ((1− n)ϕ)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−θ
Ct (3.10)
as the domestic private demand functions for home and foreign final consumption
goods.
3.2.2 Technology and production
We describe the productive sector in the home country with the notion that a set
of similar equations characterizes the foreign country.
In each country there are firms producing intermediate goods by combining national
capital with national labor services. The production technology in the intermediate
goods sector is Cobb-Douglas and we assume that intermediate firms set their prices
on the basis of Calvo (1983).
The final good sector consists of a single final good produced in each country and
sold both in the domestic and the foreign market for private consumption purposes.
However, demand for the final goods for public consumption and investment is re-
stricted to the national government and capital rental firms, respectively.
The final good sector operates under perfect competition and buys the bundle of
domestically produced intermediate goods. These inputs are combined by a Con-
stant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function.
Finally, a national capital rental firm demands the national final consumption good
and transforms it into production capital. We allow for variable capital utilization
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with quadratic adjustment costs.
The capital rental firm
The domestic representative capital rental firm transforms the homogeneous con-
sumption good into a capital good K which is used by the producers of intermedi-
ate goods producers as productive input. We assume that each domestic household
holds an identical share of the representative national capital rental firm. The capital
rental firm maximizes the discounted value of its real profits
Πkt
Pt
=
∞∑
s=0
(
1
1 + rt
)s [
(1− τk)rk,t+sKt+s − It+s − κk
2
Kt+s
(
It+s
Kt+s
− δ
)2]
where rk,t is the real rental cost for capital, It real investment and Kt the capital
stock. The formulation of the capital rental sector follows Adda and Cooper (2003).
The parameter κk > 0 scales the capital adjustment costs, when used in production
capital depreciates at rate δ > 0. The law of motion for the capital stock is given
by
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (3.11)
and the first order conditions for capital and investment are
qt = 1 + κk
(
It
Kt
− δ
)
(3.12)
qt =
Pt+1
Pt
1 + it
[
(1− τkt+1)rk,t+1 + qt+1(1− δ)−
κk
2
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)2
+ κk
(
It+1
Kt+1
− δ
)
It+1
Kt+1
]
(3.13)
where qt is the Lagrangian multiplier of the firm’s optimization problem which can
be interpreted as Tobin’s q.
Intermediate goods producer
We assume a continuum of domestic intermediate goods producers i ∈ [0, n]. Each
intermediate producer demands capital and labor for the production of its unique
variety yt(i) of the domestic intermediate good.
Because of their monopolistic power, individual domestic intermediate goods firms
have the market power to set prices. Intermediate producers maximize their profits
given a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology
yt(i) = Kt(i)
αLt(i)
1−α−θpKθpp,t (3.14)
where 0 < α+ θG < 1. We allow for government investment in infrastructure Kp,t,
for an extensive discussion of the modelling decision see Romp and de Haan (2007).
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The optimal combination of capital and labor for a given stock of public capital is
obtained from the cost minimization of intermediate producers
mct =
rk,t
α yt(i)Kt(i)
(3.15)
mct =
wt
(1− α− θp) yt(i)Lt(i)
(3.16)
where mct is the real marginal cost which is symmetric across intermediate firms.
Following Calvo (1983) an intermediate producer i is allowed to renew his price in
any period of time with probability 1−ξp. Thus, the probability that an intermediate
goods firm cannot reset its price in any of the periods between t and t + j is ξjp.
If an intermediate producer cannot update his pricing calculations, prices adjust
according to the rule
PH,t+j(i) = pi
j
MUPH,t
The optimal pricing decision in period t is given by
pH,t(i) =
φg
φg − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0(γβξp)
jmct+j
(∏j
k=1 piMU,t+k
)
Yt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0(γβξp)
jYt+j
(3.17)
and the law of motion for the aggregate price level reads
PH,t = ξppiMUPH,t−1 + (1− ξp)PH,t(i)
The final good producer
The representative domestic final goods firm transforms intermediate goods into
the homogeneous domestic final good. The final goods producer applies a CES
technology
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(i)
φg−1
φg dh
) φg
φg−1
(3.18)
where φg > 0 is the substitutability between intermediate inputs. The final goods
producer chooses his inputs i ∈ [0, n] to maximize real profits which implies
yt(i) =
(
PH,t(i)
PH,t
)−φg
Yt (3.19)
as the demand schedule for variety i facing each individual domestic intermediate
goods producer. Under the assumption of perfect competition on the final good
market, the final goods producer sets his price to ensure zero profits. Thus, the final
goods pricing rule is given by
PH,t =
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)
1−φgdi
) 1
1−φg
(3.20)
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3.2.3 The monetary and fiscal authorities
We focus on the effects of fiscal policy. To facilitate the analysis and to compare it
with the literature, we use a standard monetary policy rule. The common monetary
authority sets its instrument, the nominal interest rate it, according to the Taylor
rule
it =
1
β
− 1 + φpi(piMU,t − piMU ) (3.21)
where piMU = 0 is the inflation target. We assume that the central bank targets a
union wide inflation rate which is defined as a weighted averages of national variables,
i.e. piMU,t = npit+(1−n)pi∗t is the relevant union-wide inflation rate where 0 < n < 1
is the relative size of the domestic country. The common central bank follows the
Taylor principle and chooses φpi > 1 as the Taylor coefficient on union-wide inflation
stabilization.
For the given monetary policy, the domestic government decides on the level of
taxation and public spending. Government spending is given by
Gt = Gc,t + Ip,t (3.22)
where Gc,t is the level of purely dissipative government consumption of goods and
Ip,t the level of public investment in infrastructure. The law of motion for public
capital Kp,t is given by
Kp,t+1 = (1− δ)Kp,t + Ip,t (3.23)
where the capital depreciation rate is the same as in the private sector. Government
revenues stem from distortionary taxes on consumption τ ct , wages τ
w
t , capital income
τ kt , the level of a non-distortionary lump-sum tax/transfer Tt and issuing public debt
Dt. The real government flow budget is given by
Dt−1
1 + pit
+Gt = Tt + τ
wwtLt + τ
cCt + τ
krk,tKt + τ
k
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)di+
Dt
1 + rt
(3.24)
The model setup allows for a wide variety of possible fiscal policy measures such
as dissipative public spending on goods, public investment or cuts in distortionary
as well as lump-sum taxation. There are several instruments on the spending and
revenue side of the public budget which allow the government to balance its budget
or to decrease the level of public debt.
As is standard in the literature, fiscal policy enters the model as an exogenous
change in the level of taxation, public investment or consumption. Fiscal shocks,
e.g. a shock to government consumption
Gc,t = ρGc,t−1 + t (3.25)
evolve according to a AR(1) process where 0 < ρ < 1 measures the persistence
of the shock. We assume that, for legislative issues, fiscal expansions are always
pre-financed by debt.
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After a period of one year, the government decides on the measures which it considers
to be appropriate to return the level of the public debt stock to the assumed target
by employing a simple feedback rule
Taxt = τDt−1 + τd(Dt−1 −D) (3.26)
which may imply changes in each of the tax rates or the level of public spending
on goods and investment. If, for example, the government decides to use lump-
sum taxation as its policy instrument, the above rule implies that Taxt = Tt for
a given target level of the public debt stock D = 0. Changes in public consump-
tion or investment and distortionary taxation complete the set of possible financing
instruments.
3.2.4 Dynamic equilibria and calibration of the model
The per-capita law of motion for consumption (3.5), the optimal wage choice of
households (3.6), the definition of the household consumption basket (3.7), the
aggregate demand for home and foreign goods (3.10), and the definition of the
consumption-based price index (3.8) in the domestic country as well as their foreign
counterparts describe the demand side of the model.
The supply side is characterized by the aggregate production function of the inter-
mediate goods sector (3.14), the law of motion for the capital stock (3.11), the first
order conditions for capital and investment (3.13), (3.12) from the capital rental
sector, the optimal pricing decision for intermediate goods (3.17), the optimal com-
bination of capital and labor (3.16), (3.15) for a given stock of public capital in
the intermediate goods sector. This set of equations, together with the resource
constraints
Yt = Ct + It +Gt Y
∗
t = C
∗
t + I
∗
t +G
∗
t (3.27)
the Fisher equations
1 + it = (1 + rt)Et
Pt+1
Pt
1 + it = (1 + r
∗
t )Et
P ∗t+1
P ∗t
(3.28)
the government budget constraint (3.24) in the home and foreign country and the
current account equation
Bt = (1 + rt−1)Bt−1 + Yt − Ct − It −Gt (3.29)
where B = F − D denotes the net foreign assets position in a given period, fully
characterizes the dynamic equilibria of the model in per-capita terms. In the aggre-
gate, we assume that nB + (1− n)B∗ = 0 holds in any period of time.
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The model is closed by the feedback rules for monetary policy (3.21) and fiscal pol-
icy (3.26). We assume that national governments provide a constant level of public
investment to maintain the public capital stock and consume a constant amount of
national goods in equilibrium. The precise levels of permanent public consumption
and investment are determined by the choice of parameters; more precisely, the real
government revenues from distortionary taxation in steady state.
Following Leeper (1991), we categorize fiscal and monetary policy as being active
respectively being passive, depending on their stance to the state of public finances.
A policy authority that does not respond to the level of national public debt is ac-
tive. Thus, a systematic response of fiscal policy to the level of national liabilities
as such so that public debt is stabilized around a target level, is characterized as
passive fiscal policy.
Within the institutional framework of the EMU, the Stability and Growth Pact
limits the member country’s annual new indebtedness as well as the accumulated
stock of government debt. We assume that national fiscal policy is constrained and
sufficiently responds to the state of public finances.
Leith and von Thadden (2008) show that the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) OLG
with capital accumulation has determinate equilibria when monetary policy is active
and fiscal policy passive. In particular, in cases in which monetary and fiscal policies
are characterized by simple feedback rules such as (3.21), (3.26) and the policy in-
struments are chosen as such that φpi, τ ≥ r, τ d ≥ 0, there exist locally determinate
equilibria which are characterized by the steady state level of public debt.
The model has no closed-form solution and is solved numerically by using DYNARE.
The applied approach is a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state
following the approach of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).
We calibrate the model parameters as such so that one period of time corresponds
with one quarter. For a summary of our set of parameter chosen, see table 3.1.
Except for the country-size, all selected parameters are symmetrical for the home
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and foreign country.
The calculation of the relative size of the domestic country n = 0.27 is based on
ECB data of 2008 (www.ecb.int/stats/html/index.en.html). The domestic country
matches Germany in terms of its share of the EMU’s gross domestic product.
We suggest four alternative values for the survival probability which are γ =
0.95, 0.975, 0.99 and 1. These imply average individual planing horizons of 5, 10, 25
and an infinite number of years. Such a setup allows us to explore the impact of
failures of the Ricardian equivalence on the effects of fiscal policy. We are not aware
of any empirical consensus for γ. In the literature a value of γ = 0.99 is frequently
suggested, see e.g. Smets and Wouters (2002).
For the trade elasticity and the home bias in private consumption we set θ = 2/3
and ϕ = 0.185, respectively. These values are taken from Corsetti et al. (2009).
However, a broad variety of values for the trade elasticity can be found in the em-
pirical literature. For a broader discussion see, Corsetti et al. (2008). A higher
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, in our model, affects the
size of spillovers. In fact, spillovers increase along side the degree of substitutability
between home and foreign production.
We set the discount factor in the utility function to β = 0.99 and the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply to 2
χ
= 0.5. For a discussion of the latter choice, see Domeij and
Floden (2006). We assume that, in equilibrium, workers spend one third of their
time endowment working.
As for the capital depreciation rate we assume a value of δ = 0.025 and set 1
κk
= 0.04
which is a conventional value for quadratic capital adjustment costs according to
Adda and Cooper (2003).
In the Cobb-Douglas function, the elasticity of output with respect to private and
public capital is set to α = 0.3 and θp = 0.1 respectively. The latter value finds
itself within the range of empirical estimates reported in the survey of Romp and
de Haan (2007).
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β 2/χ 1/κk δ α θp ξp ξw τ
c τw τk ρ τd φpi n ϕ θ
0.99 0.5 0.04 0.025 0.3 0.1 0.75 0.83 0.1 0.279 0.279 0.9 0.05 1.5 0.27 0.185 2/3
Table 3.1: Calibration of the model parameters
Our model features monopolistic competition in the goods and labor markets. We
choose conventional markups of 10%. In the goods market, the average price dura-
tion is set to 4 quarters which corresponds to ξp = 0.75 and is in accordance with
the empirical evidence, see Alvarez et al. (2006). Wage contracts last longer than
price spells, we set ξw = 0.83 which implies one and a half years being the average
duration of wage contracts. The assumption that wages are more sticky than prices
is common in the literature, see Christoffel et al. (2009) or Corsetti et al. (2009) and
the references therein.
For the Taylor rule describing the behavior of the common central bank, we as-
sume a standard value of φpi = 1.5 for the Taylor coefficient. The distortionary tax
rates are set in accordance with Andres and Domenech (2006) who estimate rates
of τ c = 0.1, τw = 0.279, τ k = 0.279 on the basis of European data.
For the persistence of public spending shocks, we assume ρ = 0.9 where we follow
the example of Corsetti et al. (2009). The fiscal authorities pre-finance spending
measures by issuing public liabilities. The level of public debt is returned to the
target level according to the rule (3.26) where we assume τt = rt, τ
b = 0.05.
The first choice implies that the government finances interest payments fully by
either increased taxation or spending cuts. The second assumption implies that in
each quarter, the government repays five percent of the above-target stock of public
debt. However, such an assumption is more ambitious than the proposals of the
European Council for the the Euro Plus Pact of 24/25 March 2011.
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3.3 Fiscal stabilization policies
We assess the impact of fiscal instruments as suggested by the EERP which aimed at
holding and even reversing the economic downturn in the wake of the financial crisis
in an open economy model of a monetary union. The EERP suggested a temporary
increase in public consumption to stabilize output.
Discretionary increases in public investment were expected to strengthen aggregate
demand in the short run and contribute to the prosperity of the EU in the long run,
by improving aggregate supply. Both measures were expected to stabilize employ-
ment and therefore labor income of European consumers.
Tax cuts targeted to households were suggested as to strengthen the purchasing
power of households and with that to stabilize private demand and thus to con-
tribute to the stabilization of aggregate demand. The stabilization of output, em-
ployment and private consumption were the predominant motives of the EERP.
A major concern of the European Commission (2008) was to increase the stabiliz-
ing effect of fiscal measures by a co-ordinated approach. All member states of the
EU, depending on their room for fiscal manoeuvre, were encouraged to act simul-
taneously. The European Commission relied on the mutual occurrence of positive
spillovers of national fiscal expansions among the member states of the EU.
Our approach aims at providing results helpful for policy-making in practice. We
abstract from welfare considerations and rank alternative policy measures by their
effects on the macroeconomic variables as targeted by the European Commission.
The model is calibrated to mirror the relation between Germany, as the major econ-
omy in the EMU, and the remaining members of the monetary union. Our focus is
on discretionary fiscal measures, included in the German Konjunkturpaket II.
We evaluate an increase in public consumption and investment as well as a lump-
sum subsidy to households. We investigate how failures of the Ricardian equivalence
influence the stabilizing power of fiscal policy. Furthermore, we analyze how alterna-
tive financing decisions influence national effects and the spillovers on other members
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of the currency union.
Up to our best knowledge, there is no throughout evaluation as yet of how the
macroeconomic impact of fiscal measures is influenced by the exit strategy of the
government. We are not aware of any other study that compares fiscal measures
which are frequently used in practice in order to conduct short run stabilization
policies under alternative assumptions to the financing decision of the government
in a full-fledged two-country model of a currency union.
3.3.1 Government consumption
According to the inquiries of the OECD (2009), discretionary increases in public
consumption were implemented in all major member countries of the EMU. In par-
ticular, the measures taken were expected to stabilize national output by strength-
ening aggregate demand.
We assume an exogenous increase in public consumption according to the AR(1)
process (3.25). The domestic government finances the increased spending on goods
in advance by issuing public debt. With a time lag of one year, the fiscal authorities
decide on how to return the level of public liabilities to the initial level. For now, we
assume that the increase in public consumption is financed by lump-sum taxation
according to the simple feedback rule (3.26). The numerical results of this policy
are reported in Figs. 3.1, 3.2.
Here, as in all subsequent illustrations, the horizontal axes indicate the timepath
of variables in the periods of time in the aftermath of a fiscal policy shock. One
period of time corresponds to one quarter. Variables are expressed in deviations
from their steady state values where solid lines refer to the Ricardian case where
γ = 1, dotted, dashed and dash-dotted lines refer to our alternative values of the
survival probability, γ = 0.99, γ = 0.975 and γ = 0.95, respectively.
In the case of Ricardian households, γ = 1, the model reproduces the results of
standard new Keynesian open economy models. A shock to public consumption
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which is pre-financed by debt and paid by domestic households via taxation in the
long run, implies a negative wealth effect.
The government exclusively purchases national goods. A discretionary increase in
domestic public spending augments the demand for home goods one-to-one. In-
creases in demand for domestic goods allow producers to raise prices. They in-
crease their demand for the productive inputs capital and labor, with the effect
that marginal costs and domestic inflation rise. We observe a persistent increase in
domestic output and labor demand.
Whenever workers have a chance to reoptimize their wages, they set them with
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Figure 3.1: An increase in domestic public consumption financed by lump-sum tax-
ation.
a constant markup above the marginal disutility of labor. At that rate, domestic
households meet the increased demand for their individual skills. We observe an
increase in hours worked, while nominal labor income is rising and the domestic real
wage rate declining. The decrease in the real wage rate does not allow households
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Figure 3.2: An increase in domestic public consumption financed by lump-sum tax-
ation.
to fully offset the resulting income loss. As a consequence, households adjust their
consumption plans downwards. However, the decrease in private demand for do-
mestic final goods is more than offset by the increases in public demand.
The union-wide monetary authority targets a weighted average of the inflation rates
of the member countries of the currency union according to the Taylor rule (3.21).
It responds to the fiscal spending shock by increasing the nominal interest rate to
keep the union-wide inflation at bay. Moreover, the domestic government finances
public spending in advance by issuing public debt. These mechanisms put an up-
ward pressure on the domestic real interest rate.
The domestic inflation rate is higher than the union-wide average which is targeted
by the common central bank. Thus, the increase in the union-wide nominal interest
rate is too mild compared to the case of a national central bank following a similar
rule in the home country. According to the Fisher equation, a strong rise in do-
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mestic inflation implies a decrease in the domestic real interest rate. However, the
domestic inflation quickly returns to its pre-shock level which allows the domestic
real interest rate to rise above its steady state level.
We observe an immediate increase in domestic private investment which is followed
by a persistent period of crowding out. However, it should be recalled that the
nominal interest rate is determined at union level. Thus, these effects are small and
the response of private investment is negligible.
In summary, a temporary increase in public consumption financed by taxation affects
the domestic components of aggregate demand in different ways. Public demand in-
creases, while private demand for consumption and investment purposes decreases.
Domestic output is increased when compared to the pre-shock level.
Government spending falls exclusively on domestic final goods. Potential spillovers
are driven by domestic private demand. Because of the inflation differential, the
home country’s terms of trade improve.
The composition of public demand differs from household consumption. Households
consume home and foreign final goods according to the consumption basket (3.7).
The demand for each type of good depends on the substitutability between home
and foreign goods, the size on the national economy as well as the assumed degree
of home bias in consumption.
Households have the opportunity to substitute foreign goods for domestic goods
in their consumption basket. The latter behavior is a well known feature of two-
country models and labeled as expenditure switching and explains why the domestic
country’s net foreign asset position worsens persistently.
We observe an initial drop in foreign output which is then followed by a persistent
increase. In our baseline parametrization of the consumption basket, we assume a
value of θ = 0.66 at the lower bound of the empirical estimates for the elasticity
between home and foreign goods. Domestic and foreign output are poor substitutes.
The household’s consumption choice has an inter- as well as an intratemporal di-
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mension. The first choice is governed by the decrease in permanent income which
is implied by the assumed policy choice, i.e. the consumption-savings decision. The
second choice depends on the trade elasticity.
We observe a pronounced decrease in domestic consumption demand which slowly
returns to its initial level. Expenditure switching does not increase the demand
for foreign final goods, at least not during the first quarters after the fiscal shock.
As domestic consumption returns to its initial level, expenditure switching pushes
domestic household demand for foreign output above its steady state level.
Foreign output and employment rise. The foreign real wage rate is decreased by
the mechanism described above. Foreign households benefit from an improvement
of their net foreign asset position and consume more.
We observe positive spillovers on output, consumption and employment abroad. But
these spillovers are weak and sensitive to changes in the value of the trade elasticity,
e.g. a value of θ = 4 at the upper bound of the empirical estimates lets negative
spillovers on foreign output disappear.
The assumption of uncertain lifetime affects the consumption-saving decision of
households. If γ < 1, then taxation and public debt are no equivalent financing
instruments.
Household demand (3.4) is a function of current and future total wealth where the
weight of each component depends on the survival probability. Changes in the level
of public debt, in lump-sum taxation and in labor income imply changes in total
wealth and affect household consumption.
In the period of time during which a fiscal shock hits the economy, household income
is reduced by a drop in the real wage rate. This decrease in disposable income cannot
be fully offset by the increase in hours worked. The financing decision in terms of
increased taxation comes into effect with a lag of four quarters and decreases future
income. Between the timespan during which the increase in public consumption
occurs and the subsequent financing decision, households benefit from the positive
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wealth effects of increased public debt.
Finite lifespans mitigate the negative effects of a tax-financed increase in public con-
sumption on private demand and even reverse them for low values of γ. The shorter
the planing horizon, the more pronounced the positive wealth effects are.
We observe a more pronounced increase in domestic output and hours worked.
Again, the response of private investment is negligible, the real wage rate is de-
creased and households profit from improved terms of trade and substitute foreign
for domestic goods. The stimulus of aggregate demand is more pronounced as com-
pared to the assumption of Ricardian households and the same is true for the positive
spillovers on the foreign country.
Our results confirm previous findings in the literature, e.g. Gali et al. (2007), Coenen
and Straub (2005) or Cwik and Wieland (2010). However, these authors explore the
impact of failures of the Ricardian equivalence on household behavior by a different
route. They model a fraction of households as rule-of-thumb consumers. Similar
to our result, this literature typically finds that in order to enable a tax-financed
increase in public consumption to stimulate private demand, one has to assume a
fraction of borrowing constraint or myopic households a situation which cannot be
confirmed by empirical evidence.
For a value of γ = 0.99 proposed in other studies, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2002) and
imply an individual planning horizon of 25 years, failures of the Ricardian equiv-
alence do not affect the model predictions substantially. In particular, to obtain
model predictions such as an increase in household consumption in response to a
tax-financed public spending shock, we have to assume a very short individual plan-
ing horizon.
Modelling discretionary fiscal policy as an exogenous process and financed by taxes is
the standard approach in theoretical literature. For a recent discussion see Corsetti
et al. (2009). Our model allows for alternative financing choices by the government.
We revisit the case of a shock to public consumption by assuming that the increase
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in spending is not financed by fiscal measures which would affect the revenue-side
of the public budget but by spending cuts.
To carve out the impact of the financing decision on the effects of fiscal shocks, we
discuss the extreme case in which the assumed increase in public consumption is
completely financed by future spending cuts. The numerical results are given in
Figs. 3.3, 3.4.
If the government decides to finance additional current spending by reducing future
spending on goods, the effects of fiscal policy on aggregate demand change substan-
tially over time. In the period of time during which the public spending shock hits
the economy, public demand for goods is increased above the steady state level.
The government starts immediately to use a part of the current budget to service
its debt. With a time lag of one year, the government begins to return the level of
public liabilities to the target level. During this process which is depending on the
choice of the fiscal policy parameter τ d, government consumption decreases below
the initial level. This is precisely what Corsetti et al. (2009) label a spending rever-
sal.
We start the discussion with the Ricardian case. An increase of public consumption
which is financed by future spending cuts affects the permanent income of house-
holds. In the long run, public consumption is decreased as the cut in future spending
exceeds any temporary stimulus because of interest payments on public debt.
We assume complete home bias in public spending. Public consumption stimulates
the demand for domestic goods one-to-one. The domestic price level rises and we
observe an increase in demand for domestic productive inputs.
Employment in the home country increases and the real wage rate is persistently
decreased. The income loss from the drop in the real wage rate cannot be fully
offset by the increase in employment. Moreover, the increase in public debt absorbs
a fraction of domestic household income.
Domestic household demand is decreased for more than eight quarters following the
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Figure 3.3: An increase in domestic public consumption financed by future spending
cuts.
fiscal shock. However, the decrease in private demand for domestic final goods is
more than offset by the increase in public demand. We observe a persistent increase
in domestic production in the periods of time that follow the fiscal shock.
The common central bank responds to the increase in its monetary target by in-
creasing the union-wide interest rate. As before, this response is too mild from the
domestic country’s point of view and too restrictive for the other countries of the
monetary union. The domestic real interest rate is decreased. However, this effect
as well as the response of domestic investment is small.
In contrast to the case of a tax-financed increase in domestic public consumption
this variable does not only return to the initial level, but decreases below the equi-
librium level. The effect on aggregate demand for home goods is reversed.
A decrease in demand for domestic goods puts a downward pressure on the domes-
tic inflation rate and pushes it beneath the equilibrium value. The nominal wage
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Figure 3.4: An increase in domestic public consumption financed by future spending
cuts.
rate adjusts upwards in a staggered fashion. These two effects imply an increase
in the real wage rate above its equilibrium level over time. In addition, domestic
households benefit from interest payments by the domestic government. Thus, the
effects of the assumed policy on domestic permanent income are reversed, too.
Forward-looking households recognize the implications of such a policy and expect
increases in their future income. Domestic consumption increases above the steady
state level well before the spending reversal occurs.
The increase in private demand cannot offset the decrease in aggregate demand,
which is implied by the spending reversal in public consumption, in the medium
term. Domestic output decreases below its initial level five years after the initial
fiscal shock.
With reference to the previous case of a tax-financed increase in public spending,
the spillovers of this policy depend on the response of household consumption as
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well as on the parameter choice for the trade elasticity. We observe an improvement
in the domestic terms of trade and a persistent decrease in the home country’s net
foreign asset position.
Domestic households substitute foreign for domestic goods. Consequently, the ini-
tial response of foreign output and consumption is negative followed by persistent
increases in these variables which mirrors the response of domestic private demand.
Moreover, we observe a positive spillover on foreign employment.
Again, part of the initial negative spillover is due to the parametrization of the
model. If we switch from our baseline scenario θ = 0.66 to a value of θ = 4 at
the upper bound of the empirical estimates, the negative spillover on foreign output
vanishes.
We observe an initial decrease in domestic private demand which slowly returns to
its initial level. Moreover, home consumption demand increases above its equilib-
rium level. Foreign output and employment rise, while the foreign real wage rate is
decreased.
Foreign households benefit from an improvement of their net foreign asset position
and the persistently increased demand for foreign products. They respond to the im-
provement of their permanent income by adjusting their consumption plans upward.
Again, the spillovers of a domestic expansion of public consumption are positive and
more pronounced than in the baseline calibration. The magnitude of the spillover
effects increases with the chosen value for the elasticity between home and foreign
goods by the same mechanism as discussed above.
Uncertain lifetimes γ < 1 work through their impact on the consumption-savings
decision of households. Household demand (3.4) is a function of current and future
total wealth were the weights of each component depends on the survival probability
of individuals.
An increase in public debt is perceived as an increase in total wealth. Moreover,
real labor income and future taxation that enter total wealth affect the consumption
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decision of finitely-lived households. In the period of time during which the fiscal
shock hits the economy household income is decreased by the drop in the real wage
rate. The accumulation of public debt that is required to finance such a fiscal policy,
has a positive effect on per-capita wealth.
Finite lifetimes imply that households may die before the fiscal measure is com-
pleted. They may not live long enough to witness the spending reversal or the
period in which the level of public debt has returned to its initial level. Thus, finite
planning horizons mitigate the negative effects of fiscal policy on household income.
We observe a less pronounced drop in private demand in the time periods that fol-
low directly after the fiscal shocks. Overall, the level of private demand increases in
relation to the planing horizons of individuals, e.g. the higher the demand increases,
the shorter the planning horizons become.
The expansionary effects of fiscal policy and the spillovers are more pronounced.
Most noticeable, given the alternative financing decision of a future cut in public
consumption, private demand is increased up to values of the survival probability
which are common in the theoretical literature.
We conclude that both, failures of the Ricardian equivalence as well as the financing
decision of the government, have a strong impact on the model predictions.
3.3.2 A lump-sum transfer to households
The German Konjukturpaket II included direct transfers and debt-financed tax cuts
which were targeted at households. We explore the effects of such policies by as-
suming a lump-sum subsidy to domestic consumers that is either financed by future
taxation or decreases in public consumption.
To explain these alternative assumptions in relation to the financing decision, we
refer to the fiscal policies implemented in Germany since 2007. The Konjunktur-
paket II included measures such as lump-sum subsidies to households. However,
since then, there were no increases in tax rates. On the contrary, in 2011 the gov-
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ernment suggested tax cuts, see Bannas (06.11.2011). Although these suggestions
are currently debated at government and parliament level, they cast doubts on the
assumption that taxation being the only financing instrument of the government in
standard models.
We assume constant distortionary tax rates and a constant permanent level of public
spending. Thus, an overall increase in economic activity implies an increase in tax
revenues. We implicitly assume that in all cases in which public revenues exceed the
level of planned public spending budget surpluses are automatically redistributed to
households.
However, our model points to an obvious extension for future research. If a fiscal
stimulus leads to an increase in economic activity, then the stimulus is self-financing,
at least to some degree. For now, we focus on wealth effects and the impact of fail-
ures of the Ricardian equivalence.
We assume a lump-sum transfer which is financed beforehand by issuing public
debt. After a time period of one year the government decides on the fiscal instru-
ment in order to return the level of public debt to the target level.
We start the discussion by assuming that the fiscal measure is financed by taxation.
The numerical results are given in Figs. 3.5, 3.6. A lump-sum subsidy financed by
future lump-sum taxation is a intertemporal redistribution of income. Current gen-
erations receive a subsidy which is financed by future generations. The overall tax
burden of households is the sum of the transfer shock and the increase in taxation
which is required to finance this transfer.
The expansive effects depend entirely on the consumption-savings decisions of house-
holds. Thus, if the Ricardian equivalence holds, we observe, apart from changes in
public liabilities and lump-sum tax rates, no effect at all.
If households face uncertain planning horizons, public debt enters the model’s equi-
librium conditions and becomes a relevant state variable. Non-Ricardian households
perceive public debt as net wealth. From the time period onwards at which the
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Figure 3.5: A lump-sum subsidy to domestic households financed by lump-sum
taxation.
transfer shock hits the economy the income of domestic households rises. The gov-
ernment pre-finances the subsidy by issuing debt. Domestic households benefit from
a positive wealth effect.
With a time lag of one year, steadily increasing lump-sum taxes are levied to finance
the temporary subsidy, i.e. to pay debt services on public liabilities and to return
the stock of public debt to the target level.
Depending on the persistence of the transfer shock and the fiscal policy parame-
ters τ, τ d, the net effect on household income turns negative. Moreover, the sum
of taxation levied to return the level of public debt to the target level exceeds the
temporary subsidy in the long run, because there are interest payments on public
debt.
Thus, the effect of a lump-sum subsidy together with the related increase in public
debt on total wealth is positive on impact but turns negative as soon as the taxes
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Figure 3.6: A lump-sum subsidy to domestic households financed by lump-sum
taxation.
levied with regard to returning the level of public liabilities exceed the volume of
the subsidy. The positive wealth effect of public liabilities vanishes as soon as the
level of public debt is returned to the target level.
Wealth effects entirely depend on γ. The lower the probability to survive, which is
reflected in an increasing myopia of households, the stronger is the positive effect on
total wealth. Non-Ricardian households take the opportunity and use the additional
income to increase their consumption.
In the domestic country, the hike in demand for final consumption goods enables
producers to increase their prices. They demand more labor and capital in order to
increase their production.
As a consequence, the domestic inflation rate is higher than abroad and the response
of monetary policy is too dovish for the domestic country and too hawkish for the
remaining members of the monetary union. Similarly as before, the response of do-
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mestic investment is small and driven by the real interest rates in the home country.
In summary: Under the assumption of non-Ricardian behavior, a redistribution of
household income from future generations in favor of the current generations in-
creases current household demand. Households increase their consumption, with
the effect that domestic output and employment go up. We observe a persistent
decline in domestic real wage rates.
In contrast to public spending, households spend on home and foreign goods. The
inflation differential between the home and foreign country leads to an improvement
of the domestic country’s terms of trade. We observe positive spillovers.
Foreign output and employment improve persistently. Foreign households profit
from an improved net foreign asset position and increased labor income due to the
increased demand for foreign output in the medium term.
However, foreign real wage rates decrease and the foreign country’s terms of trade
worsen on impact. Foreign consumption is increased persistently after experiencing
a small decrease in the first quarter after the domestic transfer shock. We contrast
the tax-financed lump-sum transfer to the case where a subsidy to current genera-
tions is financed by decreases in future public consumption, see Figs. 3.7, 3.8. The
assumption that a subsidy to current generations is financed by future spending
cuts, changes the impact of the assumed fiscal measure on aggregate demand.
In terms of the standard model, this policy corresponds to a temporary balanced-
budget decrease in domestic tax rates. Ricardian households benefit from a positive
wealth effect. We observe a persistent increase in private demand. Domestic output
and employment as well as domestic inflation increase on impact. The real wage
rate in the home country decreases.
However, as the financing decision of cuts in public consumption comes into effect,
the response of these domestic variables is reversed. Public demand falls exclusively
on domestic goods. The increase in private demand cannot offset the drop in aggre-
gate demand for domestic goods which is implied by the financing decision.
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Figure 3.7: A lump-sum subsidy to domestic households financed by future spending
cuts.
Domestic households do not spend their additional income completely on domestic
goods but derive utility from home and foreign products. Thus, a fraction of the
additional income is spend on foreign goods.
In the medium term, the demand for domestic goods is decreased and foreign pro-
ducers benefit from improved demand by domestic households. Thus, the inflation
rate in the domestic country is lower than the inflation rate abroad. By construction
of the central bank’s inflation target, the response of monetary policy to mild for the
home country and too restrictive abroad. The terms of trade of the home country
worsen considerable.
The spillovers of this policy depend its impact on private demand. Domestic house-
holds demand more consumption goods both from home and foreign producers.
However, home bias in consumption and worsened terms of trade mitigate this ef-
fect on demand for foreign goods.
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Figure 3.8: A lump-sum subsidy to domestic households financed by future spending
cuts.
Foreign producers benefit from increased demand for their production. We observe
positive spillovers, foreign output, consumption and employment increase.
Allowing for failures of the Ricardian equivalence does not change the effects of a
temporary decrease in taxation which is financed by future decreases in public con-
sumption substantially. Failures of the Ricardian equivalence work by the additional
wealth channel since public debt is perceived as net wealth. The increase in private
demand is more pronounced and offsets the decrease in public demand for domestic
goods which is implied by the financing decision for several quarters more if com-
pared to the Ricardian case. The increase in household consumption is amplified,
the same is true for output, employment and the real wage rate.
The terms of trade effects are reversed. The terms of trade improve on impact and
worsen over time as private demand returns to its pre-shock level. The assumption
of finite lifetime leads to an increase in the spillovers as an overall increase in private
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demand add to the demand for foreign goods.
3.3.3 Public investment
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Figure 3.9: Domestic public investment financed by lump-sum taxation.
The European Commission (2008) strongly advocates increases in public investment
to strengthen aggregate demand in the short run and to secure Europe’s prosperity
in the long run. In practice, policymakers rely on the occurrence of such double-
dividends of public investment. Thus, public investment in infrastructure was an
important part of the German Konjunkturpaket II.
We evaluate a temporary increase in public investment which was intended to stim-
ulate the domestic economy. Technically, a shock to public investment enters ac-
cording to the AR(1) process (3.25). As before, fiscal policy is pre-financed by the
issuance of public debt. With a time lag of one year, the government decides on
the fiscal instruments employed to finance debt-services and to return the level of
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Figure 3.10: Domestic public investment financed by lump-sum taxation.
public liabilities to the target level. The choice is between an increase of lump-sum
tax rates and a future cut in public consumption.
Up to our best knowledge, the impact of spending cuts as a potential financing deci-
sion on public investment is evaluated for the first time in a full-fledged two-country
model of a monetary union.
We start our discussion with the Ricardian case by assuming that the fiscal author-
ities decide to use lump-sum taxation as their preferred financing instrument. For
the numerical results see Figs. 3.9, 3.10.
The effects of a temporary increase in public investment on the economy are similar
to a positive productivity shock in the home country. For any combination of the
productive inputs capital and labor the domestic output is increased.
Moreover, the domestic government does exclusively use home final goods to increase
the public capital stock. Thus, apart from its effects on domestic productivity, pub-
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lic investment increases the demand for domestic goods.
Domestic households anticipate these positive wealth effects in terms of increased
income as well as the negative wealth effects which are implied by the governments
financing decision. However, the positive effects on permanent income prevail and
the income of households increased.
Households have to decide if they wish to consume the whole amount of additional
income today or to save it. According to the Euler equation (3.5), domestic house-
holds base their consumption-savings decision on their expected lifetime income.
Moreover, households prefer to smooth consumption over time.
They decide to consume some of their higher income and save the rest to enable
increased consumption of goods and leisure as well as to finance future rises of tax
rates. We observe a persistent increase in consumption and private investment.
Domestic producers set their prices in a forward-looking manner. However, price-
setting is staggered and the fiscal policy shock has two opposing effects on price-
setting. Firstly, the domestic government demands more goods to bolster the domes-
tic stock of public capital. Secondly, households in the home country increase their
demand for domestic goods and with that increase their overall consumption and
to save. Both effects imply an increase in aggregate demand for home production
and, in principle, allow domestic producers to demand higher prices. But domestic
producers are also more productive which puts a downward pressure on the prices
of domestic goods.
We observe an increase in domestic prices on impact. The level of domestic public
investment decreases over time. After approximately one year, the second effect
prevails and prices fall below the pre-shock level.
This phenomenon is mirrored in the response of domestic employment which is in-
creased on impact but falls below the pre-shock level over time.
According to the Taylor rule (3.21) monetary policy responds to the average infla-
tion rate in the monetary union. The increase in public investment is restricted to
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the domestic country. Thus, the home inflation rate is increased and higher than the
inflation rate of the foreign country. The response of monetary policy is too loose
for the home country and too restrictive for the rest of the currency union. As soon
as the effects of enhanced domestic productivity prevail, the situation is reversed.
The inflation rate differential is mirrored in the terms of trade response. The terms
of trade of the domestic country improve on impact and worsen over time as the
domestic price level declines below the pre-shock level.
The spillovers are driven by private demand. Domestic households demand more
home and foreign goods as they have become more wealthy because of increased do-
mestic productivity. Moreover, while domestic terms of trade are improved because
of the strong effects of this policy on the demand for domestic goods foreign pro-
duction is comparatively cheap. However, the response of the domestic net foreign
assets as well as the spillover on the demand for foreign goods are weak. Neverthe-
less foreign output, consumption and employment are increased.
If we allow for failures of the Ricardian equivalence, the effects of a tax-financed
increase in public investment are not altered substantially. Finite lifetimes work
through their effect on the income profile of households. Depending on the assumed
degree of household myopia a fraction of the implied increase in future tax rates
occurs in time periods beyond their planning horizon.
Thus, failures of the Ricardian equivalence imply a more pronounced response of
household consumption. As a consequence, the responses of domestic macroeco-
nomic variables, e.g. domestic output and employment, are more pronounced. In
particular, as domestic consumption falls on home and foreign goods, the spillovers
on the foreign country are amplified.
However, an exogenous and temporary increase in domestic public consumption
works as an increase in domestic productivity the effects of failures of the Ricar-
dian equivalence are small.
The alternative financing decision which would imply future cuts in the budget for
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Figure 3.11: Domestic public investment financed by future spending cuts.
public consumption in order to finance a temporary increase in public investment,
does not change the effects of public investment shocks substantially either. Again,
financing public investment by reduction in future government spending alters the
policy impact on household wealth. We observe similar, but more pronounced ef-
fects, see Figs. 3.11, 3.12. The changes in the response of variables are driven by
household behavior.
The government levies a constant level of taxation which is defined by the steady
state rates of distortionary tax rates. In particular, additional tax revenues are not
spend but redistributed to households or used to cover debt services. An increase in
domestic investment financed by cuts in public consumption redistributes existing
tax revenues from unproductive consumption to the enhancement of national pro-
ductivity.
A temporary hike in public investment increases the production possibilities in our
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Figure 3.12: Domestic public investment financed by future spending cuts.
model economy. By assuming that the government finances this measure by decreas-
ing future public consumption, the negative wealth effects of such a policy choice in
terms of increasing tax rates vanishes.
The alternative financing decision of future spending cuts does increase the positive
wealth effects on households. The increase in private consumption is more pro-
nounced as compared to a tax-financed increase in public investment. In turn, the
response of household consumption amplifies the increase in domestic output and
employment. Thus, the observed inflation rate differential between the home and
foreign country as well as the spillovers increase.
Allowing for failures of the Ricardian equivalence has only small effects on the model
predictions. Again, the response of the home and foreign variables is driven by the
productivity enhancement in the domestic country. In contrast to other fiscal instru-
ments, e.g. an increase in public consumption, failures of the Ricardian equivalence
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do not have the power to change the model’s prediction qualitatively and the quan-
titative changes are small.
3.4 Conclusions
In this paper we elaborate an extended new open economy macroeconomics model of
a monetary union with the aim of exploring the effects of fiscal policy measures. We
focus on fiscal instruments that are frequently used in practice. Our model allows
for public investment and failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
The major targets of fiscal stabilization policies that were suggested by the Eu-
ropean Commission (2008) were output, household demand and employment. We
compare the impact of the fiscal instruments suggested by the EERP depending on
the financing decision of the implementing government.
We find that an increase in public consumption increases national output and em-
ployment independent of the financing decision. The response of household con-
sumption is sensitive to the financing choice of the government. If public consump-
tion is financed by future taxation, Ricardian households suffer from negative wealth
effects and adjust their consumption plans downwards. Private demand remains per-
sistently below the pre-shock level which mitigates the expansive effects of public
consumption, both on national production and employment.
When assuming that the government decides to finance increases in current spending
on goods by future decreases in public consumption, the negative wealth effects of
this policy choice are moderate. The consumption demand of Ricardian households
is decreased on impact but quickly returns to its pre-shock level. It even rises to a
higher level as compared to the pre-shock level, even before the financing decision
comes into effect. For both financing strategies, the multiplier effect on national
output is smaller than one.
The introduction of finite lifetimes implies failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
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Households perceive public debt as net wealth. A fraction of the negative effects
on household wealth, such as increases in taxation come into effect in time periods
beyond the expected lifetime of households. The level of household consumption is
always higher as compared to the case of Ricardian consumers.
But we need to assume a very high degree of household myopia, to enable the model
to predict an increase in private consumption in response to a tax-financed increase
in public consumption, i.e. a Keynesian multiplier effect on domestic output being
above one. If public consumption is financed by future spending cuts, non-Ricardian
households always respond by increasing their demand for consumption goods. We
observe a Keynesian multiplier.
The effects of a lump-sum subsidy to households crucially depend on the financing
decision of the government as well as on the assumption regarding the validity of the
Ricardian equivalence. If a lump-sum subsidy to Ricardian households is financed
by future increases in taxation, the result is that there are, apart from changes in
the level of public debt and taxation, no effects at all.
Non-Ricardian households respond to a lump-sum subsidy which is financed by
future increases in taxation by a persistent increase in consumption. Household de-
mand drives domestic output and employment, both variables increase. Thus, the
response of all variables mentioned before increases with the degree of household
myopia.
The alternative financing decision in the form of cuts in future public consump-
tion to finance contemporary subsidies to households, alters the model predictions
substantially. National output, employment and household consumption increase
on impact and they do so independently of failures of the Ricardian equivalence.
Future cuts in public consumption influence the spending side of the public budget
and thus future demand by the government for domestic production. Output and
employment are increased, but drop below the pre-shock level when the financing
decision comes into effect.
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The European Commission (2008) expected double dividends of a short run increase
in aggregate demand and a long run improvement of aggregate supply from increases
in public investment. We find that increases in public investment have effects similar
to a positive productivity shock in the home country. No matter how the govern-
ment decides to finance these measures and independently of possible failures of the
Ricardian equivalence, public investment increases domestic output, employment
and household consumption.
However, the financing decision has effects on household wealth, i.e. the magnitude
of the positive response of private consumption. If public investment is financed by
future taxation, its expansive effects are mitigated by the negative wealth effects
of the financing decision. The Keynesian multiplier on national output is always
positive and larger than one.
In our model, a temporary increase in public investment boosts economic activity
only for a limited timespan. The assumed permanent level of public investment is
only sufficient to maintain the steady state level of public capital. We find no double
dividends of public investment.
A major concern of the European Commission was that substantial positive
spillovers of national fiscal shocks would lead to free riding problems. In our model,
spillovers are driven by household consumption. Thus, these spillover can be nega-
tive on impact in case of fiscal shocks that have strong negative effects on household
wealth, e.g. increases in dissipative public spending. In the medium term, the
spillovers of fiscal policy shocks are always positive. Output, consumption and em-
ployment abroad are increased. Our results correspond to a large extend with the
empirical findings of Beetsma et al. (2006).
However, there is more than one reason to advise a co-ordinated approach to fis-
cal policy in a currency union. National fiscal policy shocks induce asymmetries
in national inflation rates. The common central bank is ill-equipped to respond to
asymmetric shocks as its inflation target is a union-wide average. Thus, in case of
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a national fiscal shock, monetary policy will always be too dovish for some and too
restrictive for other union members.
In general, a domestic fiscal shock increases the demand for national goods by more
than that for foreign goods. Thus, domestic inflation rates rise above the union-wide
average. As soon as the financing decision comes into effect, the situation reverses.
Thus, in case of a union-wide downturn, member countries that do not have the
room for fiscal maneuvre to implement a fiscal stimulus package, suffer from a too
restrictive monetary policy for several quarters of time.
Regarding the applied approach to solve the model, there might be concerns whether
a first order Taylor approximation around the steady state is suitable to evaluate
fiscal policy during a severe economical crisis. We run into technical limitations
regarding the evaluation of large shocks.
We are well aware that our model cannot provide precise numerical estimations of
fiscal multipliers in case of large shocks. However, the model matches the empirical
evidence qualitatively and allows to infer some lessons regarding the set of standard
assumptions that are frequently used for the evaluation of fiscal policy. The standard
approach to fiscal policy in theoretical models restricts its attention to exogenous
changes in public consumption which are financed by changes in lump-sum taxation.
The assumption of distortions of the intertemporal optimizing behavior of house-
holds, e.g. by the introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers, is the predominant
approach in the theoretical literature to reconcile theory and evidence in the assess-
ment of fiscal shocks. Indeed, we find that this route enables theoretical predictions
close to the empirical findings. But in order to obtain model predictions such as
an increase in private demand in response to a public consumption shock, i.e. Key-
nesian multiplier effects, we need to assume an extremely high degree of household
myopia.
With reference to the measures that were suggested by the EERP and extending
an otherwise standard model by allowing for failures of the Ricardian equivalence,
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and at the same time increasing the array of fiscal instruments on the spending and
revenue side of the public budget, we have shown that the latter is a promising way
to reconcile predictions of modern macroeconomic models with empirical evidence.
Modeling fiscal policy beyond exogenous shocks to public consumption and taxa-
tion as the single instrument of fiscal policy to finance stabilizing policies, alters the
predictions of standard model substantially.
We conclude that a more realistic approach to the choice of instruments on the
spending and revenue side of public budgets opens promising perspectives for future
research.
The financing strategy of the government has strong effects on the impact of fiscal
policy. We draw the conclusion that a fiscal stimulus is more effective, if it is fi-
nanced by future spending cuts as compared to increases in taxation. This result
mirrors the empirical results that suggest cuts in public budgets being a prerequisite
for a successful consolidation of public budgets.
Moreover, our results suggests that if a fiscal package is intended to stimulate the
economy during a recession, a credible commitment to abstain from tax increases
is required. Instead stimulus measures should be financed by future spending cuts
as such a move would amplify the intended effects. Thus, our results lend support
for the SGP and the Euro Plus Pact suggested by the European Council. However,
respective policy measures have to be implemented in a credible way.
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